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Abstract  
This paper is one of the principal outputs of this project. It provides a quantitative picture of 
some of the most important correlates of inequality in India. It does not stand on its own, but 
should be read in conjunction with a second paper, “Growth Regime, Labour Market and 
Inequality in India in Historical Perspective”, which sets the analysis of inequality in a 
broader context, and discusses the literature on many of the relationships examined here. The 
main data source is the National Sample Survey. Four rounds of the survey have been used for 
the paper: 1983 (38th round), 1993-94 (50th round), 2004-05 (61st round) and 2011-12 (68th 
round), covering both employment and consumer expenditure. In addition to the NSS, the 
NCAER Human Development Survey for 2004-05 is also used for some purposes. This is a 
national household survey like the NSS, which includes some additional information, notably 
household income. The paper also uses some data from the Annual Survey of Industry and 
national accounts, as well as price indices compiled by the Ministry of Labour.  
 








Cebrap-IHD Research Project on  














Gerry Rodgers and Vidhya Soundararajan 
 















New Delhi, July 2015 
 2 
LABOUR MARKET INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL AND INDIA 
 
 
A comparative study, carried out by the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and 
Planning (Cebrap), São Paulo and the Institute for Human Development (IHD),  
New Delhi, with support from the Canadian International Development 





High inequality in income and welfare is a major policy concern in both Brazil and India, for 
it undermines efforts to reduce poverty and promote inclusive growth. Over the last decade, 
the connections between inequality and growth, and between inequality and poverty 
reduction, have been receiving increasing attention in both national and international 
development communities. There are many sources of income inequality – production 
structures, the distribution of assets, the relative power of capital and labour, political forces 
and social hierarchy, as well as differences in education and capability. But among these 
many factors, labour market structures and institutions are of central importance. 
Understanding the pattern of labour market inequality and its determinants is therefore 
essential. 
 
The Cebrap-IHD research project aims to address these issues and their implications for 
development policies in both Brazil and India. Policy choices in the two countries intersect, 
but operate in different historical and social contexts, and have had differing degrees of 
success. Today in particular, the trends in labour market inequality in the two countries are 
different, and it is important to understand why, how far this results from underlying social 
and economic institutions and relationships, and how far from policy choices and their 
implementation. Relying on extensive existing literatures in both countries, but also 
contributing to these literatures by bringing together historical, macro and micro perspectives, 
the project aims to add to knowledge and contribute to policy choice through in-depth 
comparisons of the relationships and outcomes in the two countries. 
 
The methodology of the project combines three difference approaches. The first is a long term 
historical analysis of the social, institutional and economic changes that affect labour market 
inequality; the second is an empirical analysis of survey data, which investigates the patterns 
and determinants of inequality and their changes over time; and the third is a process of policy 
dialogue that brings together social actors and researchers to examine policy implications. 
 
The project teams include Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, Maria-Cristina Cacciamali, Fabio 
Tatei and Ian Prates from Cebrap, São Paulo; and Taniya Chakrabarty, Nandita Gupta, Gerry 
Rodgers, Janine Rodgers and Vidhya Soundararajan from the Institute for Human 
Development, New Delhi.  
 
This project is being carried out with the financial support of the International Development 
Research Centre, Canada.  
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Patterns of inequality in India, 1983-2011/12 
 





This paper provides a quantitative picture of some of the most important correlates of 
inequality in wages and expenditure in India. It does not stand on its own, but is designed as a 
complement to a second paper, currently under preparation within the Cebrap-IHD project on 
Labour Market Inequality in India and Brazil, entitled “Growth Regime, Labour Market and 
Inequality in India in Historical Perspective”, which sets the analysis of inequality in a 
broader context, and discusses the literature on many of the relationships examined here. For 
that reason there is little reference to the literature in this paper. It should also be read in 
conjunction with a similar paper under preparation for Brazil, since it has been designed to be 
part of a comparative analysis, and this has an influence on the choice of issues to analyse and 
techniques to use. A separate paper comparing the results for the two countries is also in 
preparation. More details and full references to publications may be found on the project 
website, www.ihdindia.org/lmi. 
 
The main data source is the National Sample Survey (NSS). Four rounds of the survey have 
been used for the paper: 1983 (38th round), 1993-94 (50th round), 2004-05 (61st round) and 
2011-12 (68th round), covering both employment and consumer expenditure. These four years 
provide a good picture of long term trends. In addition, they were all average to good 
agricultural years, which implies that they are broadly comparable. Large deviations in 
agricultural production can have significant effects on results, especially in rural areas, 
making the interpretation of trends unreliable.  
 
Other data sources used include the NCAER Human Development Survey for 2004-05. This, 
like the NSS, is a national household survey, which covers some additional topics, notably 
household income. It therefore permits us to compare income inequality with inequality of 
wages and expenditure. The paper also uses some data from the Annual Survey of Industry 
and from National Accounts, as well as price indices compiled by the Ministry of Labour. For 
more details on data sources see “Data Sources for the Analysis of Labour Market Inequality 
in Brazil and India” by Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, Maria Cristina Cacciamali, Gerry 
Rodgers, Vidhya Soundararajan, Fabio Tatei, Rogerio Barbosa, J. Krishnamurty, IHD 
Working Paper 03/2014. 
 
The two principal dimensions of inequality in the labour market concern inequality in labour 
incomes, and inequality in access to employment. This paper mainly examines labour 
incomes, though we also consider some aspects of unequal access to employment. The 
National Sample Survey provides data on the wages of all employed household members, but 
not on income from self-employment. In practice, then, we focus on wage inequality. The 
NSS also collects information on household expenditure. Expenditure can be used as a proxy 
1 Institute for Human Development, New Delhi. This paper has benefitted from the contributions of the other 
members of the team working on the Cebrap-IHD project on Labour Market Inequality in Brazil and India, in 
particular Nandita Gupta, Taniya Chakrabarty and Janine Rodgers from the Institute for Human Development,  
and Maria-Cristina Cacciamali, Fabio Tatei, Ian Prates and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa from Cebrap. We are 
also grateful to Sandip Sarkar of IHD for helpful comments. 
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for overall income, including not only all sources of labour income but also income from 
interest, rent and other sources. However, labour income is by far the largest component of 
income, except in the highest income groups.  
 
Section 1 gives broad trends in patterns of inequality of wages and of expenditure. Section 2 
then decomposes wage inequality in terms of five principal factors: type of work, gender, 
social group, education and region. Section 3 presents a similar, though more limited exercise 
for household expenditure. Section 4 brings these variables together in a multivariate 
decomposition of inequality. Section 5 gives some comparisons between measures of 
inequality in wages, expenditure and income. Section 6 examines the macro-level question of 
the functional distribution of income. Finally, section 7 considers some aspects of unequal 
access to different occupations, and the wage differentials between them.
 6 
1. Trends in inequality 
 
1.1  Wages 
 
Basic data on wages and wage inequality are given in Graphs 1.1 to 1.9 (for India as a whole, 
and separately for rural and urban areas). Sources for these graphs and, except where 
otherwise indicated, for other graphs and tables in this paper are unit level data from the 
National Sample Survey Organization employment and unemployment and household 
expenditure surveys for 1983, 1993-94, 2004-05 and 2011-12. 
 
Graph 1.1 shows the trend in real wages over time. Money wages were converted to 2004-05 
prices using the consumer price series for industrial workers in urban areas, and for 
agricultural labourers in rural areas (table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Price indices for industrial workers and agricultural labourers 
 
CPI - IW (base 
1982=100) 
Standardized                    
CPI - IW 
CPI-AL (base 
1986-87=100) 
Standardized                        
CPI – AL 
1983 102.2 0.20 85.4 0.25 
1993-1994 257.9 0.50 203.8 0.60 
2004-2005 519.5 1.00 339.5 1.00 
2011-2012 891.8 1.72 613.7 1.81 
Notes: CPI-IW is the consumer price index for industrial workers; CPI-AL is the consumer price index for 
agricultural labour. 
Source: Indian Labour Bureau (labourbureau.nic.in). 
 
 
Overall, mean wages grew throughout this period at an accelerating pace, 1.9 per cent per 
year between 1983 and 1993-4, 3.4 per cent per year between 1993-94 and 2004-05 and 5.3 
per cent between 2004-05 and 2011-12. Clearly wage workers shared in the growth of the 
Indian economy. On the other hand, the growth of wages was lower than the growth of GDP 
per capita (2.7%, 4.4% and 6.9% per annum in the three periods concerned). One implication 
of this difference in growth rates is that wage income declined relative to income from capital 
and other sources, and that this gap was increasing over time. We examine the functional 
distribution of income in more detail in section 6 below. 
 
Both rural and urban areas shared in this growth in wages. Over the period as a whole, rural 
wages rose by 3.5 per cent per year; urban wages by 2.9 per cent. The rural to urban wage 
ratio rose from 0.36 in 1983 to 0.43 in 2011-12. We can therefore conclude that rural-urban 
inequality in the labour market declined at the aggregate level. 
  
This shift in favour of rural wages was greater in the more recent period. Rural wages grew by 
2.3 per cent from 1983 to 1993-94, compared with 2.2 for urban. From 1993-94 to 2004-05 
rural wages grew at 3.6 per cent and urban at 2.2; from 2004-05 to 2011 rural wages grew at 
5.2 per cent, urban at 4.7. 
 
There are a variety of different ways to characterize wage inequality. Graphs 1.2 and 1.3 give 
the most common overall measures, the Theil index2  and the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient is the most widespread single measure, but the Theil index has the advantage that 
2 We use the Theil t index (GE(1)) throughout. 
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it can easily be decomposed into inequality within and between particular groups, a property 
which we use in later sections.  
 
The Theil index for wage inequality overall shows a clear pattern over time (Graph 1.2). 
Inequality fell between 1983 and 1993-94, rose between 1993-94 and 2004-05, and fell again 
between 2004-05 and 2011-12. The overall level of the index at the end of the period was not 
much different from its level at the beginning. The Gini index shows a similar pattern (Graph 
1.3), except that the reduction in inequality in the 1980s was less, and the rise after 1993-94 
was greater. 
 
A rural-urban breakdown suggests that this overall picture was the result of opposite trends in 
rural and urban areas (Graphs 1.4 and 1.5). In rural areas, the Theil index declined overall, 
with a reversal between 1993-94 and 2004-05. This pattern has some similarity with the 
overall trend, except that the reversal in the middle period was offset by an equally large 
decline between 2004-05 and 2011-12. In urban areas, however, wage inequality rose sharply 
in period 2, but instead of declining thereafter continued to rise to some extent in period 3.  
Once again, the Gini coefficient shows a very similar pattern.3 
 
Both Theil and Gini indices reduce a complex pattern of inequality to a single figure, and it is 
also interesting to look at specific aspects of the distribution. Graphs 1.6 to 1.8 give the 10:10 
ratio, that is to say the ratio between the average wage of the top 10 per cent and the bottom 
ten per cent of the wage distribution. It is therefore a measure of how far the distribution is 
stretched at the extremes. Overall we find that the ratio between the top and the bottom for the 
population as a whole narrowed in period 1, from 17.6 to 16.6. It then increased considerably 
in period 2, from 16.6 to 20.2, before falling back to 16.2 in period 3 (Graph 1.6). This pattern 
is similar to that for the Gini and Theil coefficients for the period as a whole.  
 
When we split the 10:10 ratio into rural and urban areas, we find some similarities and some 
differences with the Gini and Theil patterns. Overall we see that the 10:10 wage ratio is much 
higher in urban than in rural areas, which is as expected and consistent with the Gini and 
Theil results. In rural areas, the ratio fell in period 1, rose in period 2 and then fell again in 
period 3, so the overall trend was downwards, much like both Theil and Gini coefficients. In 
urban areas the trend was upwards in both periods 1 and 2, but there was some reversal after 
2004-05, and the ratio fell back to its 1994 levels by 2011-12, although it remained 
significantly higher than in 1983. If we compare this with the Gini/Theil pattern, we see that 
the gap between the top and the bottom in urban areas was already widening before the 
economic reforms of the early 1990s, but this must have been compensated by some 
redistribution further down the income scale, since the Gini and Theil increased only slightly. 
In period 2 inequality rose for both measures, but the decline in the 10:10 ratio after 2004-05 
differs from the Gini and Theil, which rose slightly. This suggests that the main gains were 
concentrated in upper wage earners below the top 10 per cent, or that the lowest wage earners 
did better than those just above them.  
 
The distribution of wage income for workers at different levels of the wage distribution is 
presented in graph 1.9. The share of the top 10% of wage earners rose from 36 to 40 per cent 
over the period as a whole, and that of the middle 40 and bottom 50 fell, but most of the 
change occurred between 1993-4 and 2004-05. Overall, considering that this was a thirty year 
period with quite dramatic economic changes, it might well be concluded that the distribution 
3 We will use “period 1” for 1983 to 1993-94, “period 2” for 1993-94 to 2004-05 and “period 3” for 2004-05 to 
2011-12. 
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of wage income was surprisingly stable, with some limited transfers from the middle and the 
bottom to the top.  
 
These different measures do not all tell exactly the same story, but there is a fairly consistent 
picture. On balance inequality has increased since 1983, with the increase concentrated in 
urban areas and in the period 1994 to 2005; thereafter the tendency was for inequality to 
stabilize or decline, especially in rural areas, and helped by a reduction in the urban-rural 
wage gap. An increase in the share of the top 10 per cent was mainly at the expense of those 
in the middle of the distribution, rather than those at the bottom. 
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Graph 1.6: 10:10 wage ratio, all India  















Graph 1.7: 10:10 wage ratio, rural  

















Graph 1.8: 10:10 wage ratio, urban  















Graph 1.9: Overall pattern of distribution of wage income (all India) 
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45% 45% 41% 43%





















1.2 Expenditure per capita 
 
Graph 1.10 shows that household expenditure per capita (using the NSS expenditure surveys4) 
rose at an annual rate of 1.7 per cent per annum in rural areas for the period as a whole, and 
slightly faster, 1.85 per cent in urban areas. The gap between rural and urban areas in 
expenditure is therefore widening slowly, although both are rising. This is the opposite of 
what was found for wages, where the gap between rural and urban areas was narrowing. This 
is possible, because expenditure reflects self-employed incomes as well as wages. It would 
imply that self-employed incomes in rural areas were rising slower than wages or slower than 
self-employed incomes in urban areas. This is quite plausible if farm incomes were declining 
relative to wage incomes.  
 
The growth in expenditure accelerated over time, 0.6 per cent per year in rural areas in period 
1 against 1 per cent in urban areas; 1.6 against 1.2 in period 2; and 3.4 against 4.1 in period 3. 
These increases are notably one to two per cent less than the annual increases in real wages, 
 
The general, systematic tendency is for the expenditure data to show lower inequality, 
whether measured by Theil or Gini, than the wage data. There are a number of reasons why 
this is to be expected. One is a general tendency for expenditure to be less unequally 
distributed than income, which we discuss in section 5. Another is that non-wage income 
(which of course affects expenditure) is likely to be less equally distributed than wage 
income. A third is that households will tend to have both male and female members, and often 
both young and old members, so these factors, which impinge on wage inequality, are less 
reflected in aggregate household income. 
 
The measures of expenditure inequality show little change between 1983 and 1993-94 overall, 
but this is the result of a decline in inequality within rural areas and an increase in urban areas 
(together with some increase in the gap between them)(Graphs 1.11 to 1.13). This is quite 
consistent with the wage data, which also show some decline in inequality between these two 
dates in rural areas, and some increase in urban areas. However the wage data suggest that 
there was some decline in inequality overall, which is not the case for the expenditure data. 
 
After 1993-94 and up to 2004-05, expenditure and wage measures coincide in showing a 
rather significant increase in inequality in both rural and urban areas, and overall. After 2004-
05, however, the expenditure data diverge from the wage data, in rural areas at least, because 
overall expenditure inequality continues to rise, as measured by both Theil and Gini 
coefficients in both rural and urban areas, while in the wage data inequality fell in rural areas.  
 
It is quite likely that this pattern reflects the growing integration of rural and urban areas. 
Rural households are increasingly gaining access to urban employment. This may have a 
different effect on wages and on expenditure. On wages, it may drive casual wages up in rural 
areas, because of the availability of higher-paying urban alternatives, and so reduce wage 
inequality. But at the same time, well-off rural households may have increasing access to 
incomes from urban areas, and indeed greater opportunities to spend this income. It is 
possible that trends in non-wage incomes also play a role. On this we have no direct 
information, but there is reason to believe that income from capital is increasing compared 
with wages, and this would tend to increase income inequality. 
4 Expenditure data are also collected in the employment survey, but the data from the specialized expenditure 
survey carried out in the same rounds appear to be more reliable, so that source is used for this section. 
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The 10:10 ratios do not show exactly the same pattern (Graphs 1.14 to 1.16). The first point to 
note is that these ratios are much smaller than the corresponding wage ratios – between 3 and 
4 in rural areas against 10 to 12 for wages, and between 4 and 5 in urban areas against 16 to 
20. That the ratios for consumption are only a quarter of the ratios for wages is partly due to 
the equalizing effect of the consolidation of income within households, though it may also 
reflect underestimation of expenditure, in particular among higher income groups. 
 
The trend is slightly different from the overall measures. In rural areas, there is a significant 
drop in the rural ratio in period 1, followed by a rise in periods 2 and 3. This pattern is similar 
to that for the Gini and Theil indices, but the rise is smaller for the 10:10 ratio. This suggests 
that the gap between top and bottom in rural areas has not widened as much as might be 
expected from the overall trend in inequality. In urban areas, on the other hand, the rising 
trend is very similar to the overall picture shown by the Gini or Theil indices.  
 
Finally the overall pattern of distribution in graph 1.17 shows a transfer of around 3 
percentage points of expenditure from the poorest 50 per cent to the top 10 per cent since 
1994, with less change for the middle groups. The change over time is very similar to that for 
wages, but the share of the top 10 per cent is 7 percentage points less than for wages, and the 
share of the bottom 40 per cent is 6 percentage points more. As in the case of wages, the 
stability of the distribution is striking, with only a slow long term trend. 
 
Graph 1.10: Real monthly household expenditure per capita, rural and urban India 
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Graph 1.14: 10:10 ratio for average monthly per capita expenditure – all India 
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Graph 1.17: Overall pattern of distribution of monthly per capita expenditure  
(all India) 
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2. Patterns of wage inequality 
 
The next step is to explore some of the factors associated with these patterns of and trends in 
inequality. Of course, the broader forces driving inequality need to be understood in societal 
and historical context – and that is the subject of a separate paper (Barbosa et al., 2015). Here 
we investigate some of the main characteristics of individuals and jobs that are found in the 
literature to be strongly associated with wage inequality. Note again that we are obliged, for 
reasons of data availability, to confine our analysis to waged and salaried workers, excluding 
the self-employed. 
We examine the following factors, which are available from the National Sample Survey: 
1) Work type 
2) Gender 
3) Social group (caste and religion) 
4) Education 
5) Region of residence 
 
We present the pattern of inequality for each of these factors, and investigate their importance 
in relation to other factors.  These factors are not equivalent, even in theory. The first, work 
type, is a characteristic of labour markets rather than of individuals, and constitutes an 
endogenous market outcome. Gender and social group are (almost) fixed characteristics of 
individuals, and so exogenous. Region of residence and education are also characteristic of 
individuals, but they are not fixed. Region in particular is endogenous through migration, 
while education is acquired (though essentially fixed once adulthood is reached). Wage 
differentials by education may be simply a reflection of social hierarchy, in which education 
plays the role of a mechanism to transmit inequality from one generation to the next. There 
may, for instance, be a strong interrelation between education and social group, in which 
social group is in some sense prior to education. These differences need to be borne in mind 
in interpreting the patterns. 
 
The whole analysis is carried out separately for urban and rural areas. There are considerable 
differences between rural and urban areas in wages, labour market structures and more 
generally in social and economic patterns, which imply that the two should not be merged in a 
single analysis. Of course it is a simplification to treat urban and rural areas as separate. Rural 
residents have access to labour markets through commuting and migration, so the two areas 
are in reality linked. And there is in reality a graduation from remote rural areas though semi-
urban peripheries to large cities, so the distinction between rural and urban areas is just the 
first step towards understanding a more complex picture. 
 
For analyzing inequality under each of these themes, we first consider wage ratios between 
different categories of worker. Second, we look at the histograms (kernel density functions) of 
nominal wages and of log wages for different types of work and discuss whether there has 
been any change over time on the basis of a visual inspection. It is also interesting to break 
this down for selected subgroups, notably distinguishing women and men. Third, we 
decompose wage inequality (the Theil index) by the major categories under each of the 
themes are considering. Subsequently we present some multilevel decompositions, which 
combine several of these factors. More detailed multivariate analysis is presented in section 4. 
 
Decomposition is a widely used technique to distinguish inequality within particular groups 
from inequality between them, and the Theil index has the convenient property that it is easily 
decomposed into additive components. Nevertheless it is easy to over-interpret the results. As 
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Elbers et al point out (2007), the “between-group” inequality depends not only on differences 
in means between the groups, but also on the number of the groups and their relative sizes. If 
one group is much large that the others, variation within that group will tend to dominate the 
results. Moreover, within group inequality using sample survey data reflects not only random 
variation and a host of unobserved factors, but also measurement error. The fact that the 
“between” component for a specific variable is small therefore does not mean that it is 
unimportant. On the other hand, these factors, insofar as they do not change over time, should 
have less impact on trends. If the “between” component rises or falls over time, it is likely that 
this reflects in some way a change in the importance of the factor concerned.  
 
It is also important to note that the decomposition of wages misses differential access to 
different categories of employment, which may lead to labour market exclusion. This is 
particularly important for women, who may well be excluded from the labour market, or 
confined to unpaid family labour, which is not captured here, rather than paid lower wages. 
So wage inequality does not fully capture labour market inequality, for some inequality will 
be the result of differential access to particular occupations. We will look at wage inequality 
within occupational groups in section 7 to explore this further. 
 
While an analysis of regional differentials is included here, the patterns can be quite different 
across Indian states. For certain issues we have therefore looked specifically at three states: 
Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Punjab. However, for purposes of this paper we mostly remain at the 
all-India level. Detailed differences across states merit another paper. 
 
2.1 Work type  
 
In India, the most basic distinction in the labour market is between casual, daily work (usually 
daily paid, and usually without written contract or social protection) and regular work (a 
diverse category which includes both longer term, often monthly paid work without contract 
or protection, but also regular salaried work in both public and private sector employment. 
This is now a conventional breakdown, incorporated in NSS and other survey questionnaires. 
In reality the distinction is not always clear. A lot of “casual” work is in reality quite regular, 
in the sense that there is a continuing employment relation, while there are intermediate 
categories such as contract work where payment may be irregular. Nevertheless this 
distinction is embedded in the statistics and is the most convenient measure of labour market 
segmentation. 
 
Graphs 2.1 and 2.2 show the wage ratios between these two types of employment over time.5 
In rural areas, casual wages are of the order of 40 per cent of regular wages. The ratio of mean 
casual to regular wages fell from 1983 to 2004-05, and then rose again in 2011-12. In urban 
areas, the difference between casual and regular wages is comparable with that in rural areas, 
and the overall pattern of change over time – falling and then rising – is also similar, although 
the amplitude of the change is much less. The main reason for this pattern seems to be a 
tightening of the market for casual labour after 2004-05, a phenomenon which apparently 
affects India as a whole, and which is certainly connected with higher GDP growth. As for 
urban-rural differences, there does seem to have been a progressive national integration of the 
casual wage labour market, which has driven up casual wages in rural areas because these are 
source areas for urban unskilled migrant labour.  
5 A number of assumptions are made in the collecting and reporting of the data to convert salaries of regular 
workers to an equivalent daily payment. Some of these assumptions can be questioned (see for instance Ajit 
Ghose, 2014) but for purposes of this analysis we use the NSS figures. 
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This tightening of the labour market seems to have been a major factor in the reduction of 
inequality in rural areas after 2004-05, which we noted in the last section.  
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This ratio concerns the means. But there is a wide variation of wages between individuals. 
Graph 2.3 gives histograms of log wages for regular and casual workers for our four years.6 
We use log wages because it is easier to see the pattern. These are standardized so that the 
mean log wage (for all workers) is zero in the graph. In general we can see that 
a) While there is substantial variation for both regular and casual work, it is larger for 
regular wages, which reflect a wider variety of work situations. Casual wages are more 
concentrated, as can be seen from the higher bars 
b) While there is a large difference in the means between the two groups, they overlap 
considerably. Casual wages tend to be concentrated in the range -2 standard deviations 
(of log wages) to +1; regular wages in the range -1 to +2. But for both a high 
proportion of observations are in the range -1 to +1 standard deviation 
c) While changes in the pattern over time are hard to isolate visually (note that the scale 
for the first two years is different from the last two years), casual wages can be seen to 
have become more concentrated, while regular wages have become more dispersed. 
This is in fact borne out by the Gini coefficients of wage inequality, which fell fairly 
sharply for casual work in both urban and rural areas (from 0.33 to 0.27 in rural and 
6 These histograms exclude the top 1% of the distribution and wages recorded as zero, some of which may be 
errors or concerns special situations. 
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from 0.35 to 0.29 in urban areas), but which rose for regular work from 0.36 to 0.47 in 
urban areas, and from 0.43 to 0.44 in rural areas.  
 
Graph 2.3: Histograms of log nominal wages (standardized, and excluding top 1% of 




































































We might infer that the observed growth in inequality in urban areas at least comes in part 
from an increasing dispersion of regular wages. This would be particularly true of the period 
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from 1993-94 to 2004-05, when the ratio of casual to regular wages did not change much. In 
the period since 2004-05 rising dispersion of regular wages was compensated by the increase 
in casual wages relative to regular.  
We then decompose the Theil measure of inequality (see the discussion above) by work type 
(graph 2.4). It can be seen that the “between” component, that is to say the difference between 
regular and casual wages, accounts for a substantial proportion of all wage inequality. In rural 
areas, it rises from 19 per cent in 1983 to 34% in 1993-94. This was a period when the ratio of 
mean casual to regular wages declined from .43 to .38, which is no doubt an important 
explanation. Thereafter the contribution of the between component declined, especially after 
2004-05, reflecting the opposite factor of a rise in mean casual wages in relation to regular. 
But the different between the two types of work still accounts for almost a quarter of 
inequality in 2011-12. 
 
Graph 2.4: Decomposition of wage inequality across regular and casual workers 
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In urban areas the pattern of change over time is somewhat similar, but less marked, and by 
2011-12 the casual:regular difference accounts for only 12 per cent of wage inequality. 
However, this can largely be explained by the smaller fluctuations in the casual:regular wage 
ratio in urban than in rural areas. Increased dispersion of regular wages, as noted above, 
probably also played a role – since as this becomes more important in inequality the 
contribution of the casual:regular differential declines.  
 
To sum up, the segmentation of the labour market into casual and regular work makes a 
substantial contribution to wage inequality overall, but one which is more important in rural 
than in urban areas, and which has been declining since 1994. The decline in the importance 
of this segmentation reflects both the increasing dispersion within regular work (reducing the 
relative importance of the casual-regular differential), and more recently both an increase in 
the share of regular work and a tightening of the market for casual labour which has reduced 
wage differentials.  
 
2.2 Gender  
 
Women’s wages are much lower than men’s, on average, but the overall ratio has been rising, 
from 0.5 in 1983 to 0.7 in 2011-12 (Graph 2.5). However, this has not been a uniform 
improvement, since it results from the combination of a number of different factors. 
 
Graph 2.5: Ratio of female to male wages for different work categories, urban and 



















As can be seen from graph 2.5, the female:male wage ratios for each type of work – regular 
and casual, urban and rural – show a much less consistent trend than for the labour market as 
a whole. While the ratio has risen in three of the four categories, the rise is less and less 
regular than the overall figure. The change in the overall ratio therefore has to reflect a shift in 
the pattern of women’s employment towards types of work where the wage differential with 
men is lower.  
This shift can be clearly seen in table 2.1. In 1983 women were heavily concentrated in casual 
rural work, to a much greater extent than men, 44% of whom were in regular work in either 
urban or rural areas, as against 17 per cent of women.  Over time, these disparities decreased. 
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By 2011-12, 22 per cent of women were in regular urban work, still less than men at 27 per 
cent but the gap had closed. The same was true in rural areas. There was a corresponding 
sharper decline in the dependence of women on casual wage employment. So although gender 
inequality in the type of job remained, it had been reduced – and this was clearly reflected in 
the reduction in the overall wage disparity, a reduction that was greater overall than for 
individual categories of wage employment. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that 
women’s share of wage workers declined from 28 per cent in 1983 to 23 in 2011-12. So while 
some of the decline in casual rural work was replaced by regular work at a higher wage, a 
significant proportion was replaced by withdrawal from the labour force, which of course 
does not appear in the wage data. So the improvement in the labour market situation of 
women is exaggerated by these data.  
 
Table 2.1: Distribution of male and female wage workers across regular-casual and 
urban-rural categories, 1983 to 2011-12 (%). 
 1983 1993-94 2004-05 2011-12 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male  Female 
Regular urban 25 9 24 11 25 16 27 22 
Casual urban 8 9 8 8 8 6 9 7 
Regular rural 19 8 15 7 16 10 15 13 
Casual rural 49 74 52 73 51 68 49 58 
 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
         
Distribution of 
all workers by 
sex (per cent)  72 28 72 28 73 27 77 23 
Note: This table uses Current Weekly Status (CWS) to measure work, i.e. based on whether an economic activity 
was done in the seven days prior to the survey. NSS has four different measures of employment, of which the 
most commonly used is UPSS (usual principal and subsidiary status). We use CWS because the wage data refer 




To fully understand the pattern we also need to understand the nature of women’s regular 
work. In rural areas, for instance, it tends to be dominated by teaching and health work. Men 
have a wider range of options. In that case the trends in the wage ratio between men and 
women depend mainly on which types of jobs are expanding. We need to break this down by 
occupation to understand it properly. 
 
In urban casual work there is a clear, systematic upward trend in the wage ratio, from 0.48 to 
over 0.6. This can probably be understood in terms of the gradual exhaustion of the unskilled 
labour surplus. In rural areas the pattern is not so strong, though the trend is still upwards in 
the recent period. Women in rural labour markets are less well integrated into the national 
labour market because they are less able to migrate than men, on the whole.  
Histograms of the wage distribution also suggest something that cannot be observed in the 
averages. As Graph 2.6 shows, in 1983, while the distribution of male and female wages 
overlap, men visible predominate at the upper end of the scale for all categories of work, 
casual and regular and urban and rural. In 2012 this is no longer the case in regular work. As 
many women as men are found at the upper end of the scale. But men predominate in the mid 
levels and women at the bottom. The distribution for women is almost bimodal. This is less 
true for casual work, which has changed much less.  
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Graph 2.6: Histogram of standardized nominal log wages across gender and work 
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The decomposition of inequality by gender is interesting and in some respects puzzling. In 
rural areas, the contribution to inequality of sex differences in wages has fluctuated, with a 
peak at 11% in 1993-94 and a minimum of 5% in 2011-12 (graph 2.7). In urban areas, 
however, the contribution of gender differences declines steadily, to no more than 1 per cent 
in 2011-12. It is plausible that the contribution of sex differences in wages to inequality has 
declined, but not so much, since a considerable gap in mean wages persists. 
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This turns out to be at least in part a compositional effect, because when we separate casual 
and regular work the effects are quite different. Graph 2.8 shows that for casual workers 
alone, sex differences continue to account for a significant proportion of overall inequality in 
both urban and rural areas, although declining in both since 2004-05. For regular workers, on 
the other hand (graph 2.9), the contribution of gender is small with no clear overall trend. It 
should be noted that the bimodal pattern of the wage distribution for women will not be 
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picked up in this type of decomposition, so differences in gender patterns can still be 
important. And of course, we are only discussing wages here. There are well known 
differences in labour market access for men and women, to the disadvantage of women. 
 

























Graph 2.9: Decomposition of wage inequality by sex, regular workers 
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2.3 Inequality between social groups 
 
In India there are strong reasons to expect wage inequalities across a variety of social groups, 
for labour markets are segmented and caste and religion are important factors in this 
segmentation, facilitating and legitimizing it where they do not cause it. 
 
However, the notion of a social group is a flexible one, and the role played by different caste 
groups has changed over time. In the National Sample Survey the only consistent distinction 
has been that between Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes on the one hand, and all others, 
reflecting the recognition in India’s Constitution of the disadvantage suffered by the former 
groups. This breakdown is available back to 1983. Starting in the 1980s there was a wider 
recognition of the notion of OBCs (Other Backward Classes), leading eventually to 
reservations for this group in public sector employment and educational institutions.7 
7 See Barbosa et al (2015) for more discussion of this issue.  
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Subsequently OBCs were also identified in the NSS questionnaire, but only as from the 2004-
05 survey.  
 
The caste breakdown intersects with the breakdown by religion. The largest group other than 
Hindus, Muslims, also needs to be separated out because labour markets are to some degree 
segmented by religion. In addition, there is now an admitted distinction among Muslims 
between OBCs and others – the latter, like the “other” Hindus, tend to be better off groups. In 
addition there are a number of other religious minorities in India, including Christians, 
Buddhists, Sikhs, and other smaller groups, some of them quite regionally concentrated.  
 
All of these different identities are associated with differences in access to employment; 
indeed the original foundation of caste is occupational segmentation, even if it is much diluted 
today. Some identities are also a source of direct discrimination. In order to explore how far 
these factors influence wage inequality, we have looked at two breakdowns, both a 
simplification of a complex reality. The first merely distinguishes Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) from the rest. There are of course important differences between SC 
and ST in way of life and labour market integration, but we neglect those for the moment. 
This distinction can be maintained in the four rounds of the NSS that we are using. 
 
The second tries to capture some more complex patterns. We can identify the following 
groups for the 2004-05 and 2011-12 surveys: 
• Scheduled Tribe 
• Scheduled Caste 
• Hindu Other Backward Class (which despite the name includes both lower and middle 
castes) 
• Hindu - other caste (mainly upper castes) 
• Muslim Other Backward Class 
• Muslim – other (mainly upper groups) 
• Other religion 
 
Graph 2.10 shows the wage ratios for all other groups in relation to Scheduled Caste/Tribe, 
for rural and urban areas, since 1983. It can be seen that the overall differential remains high 
in 2011-12, 27% in rural areas and 43% in urban, and slightly higher overall (55%) because 
SC and ST tend to be concentrated in lower wage rural areas. But there is some sign that the 
ratio, after fluctuating between 1983 and 2005 with little clear trend, has started to come 
down. It fell by about 8 per cent in rural areas, 4 per cent in urban areas and 9 per cent overall 
between 2005 and 2012. This pattern can largely be traced to the improvement in the relative 
position of casual workers, where STs and SCs are overrepresented (as we discuss below). 
 
 29 





















Despite the relatively high wage ratios, the decomposition (graph 2.11) indicates that the 
contribution to overall inequality of this division between SC/ST and the rest is quite small – 
of the order of 2 to 3 percent, with the decline visible in the last year. 
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The more detailed classification of social groups shows that there are important differences 
between other groups as well as those between SC/ST and others. It can be seen in graph 2.12 
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that Hindu OBCs have higher wages than Scheduled Castes, but the difference is not large 
and there is no clear trend, nor is there much difference between rural and urban areas. There 
is not much difference between Hindu OBCs and Muslim OBCs either, although there is some 
sign of the gap increasing between 2004-05 and 2011-12, especially in urban areas. The gap 
between “other” (upper) Hindus and Hindu OBCs is quite considerable, a wage ratio of 2 
overall. It is lower in rural areas and showing some tendency to decline, but in urban areas it 
is stable. And the ratio between “other” Hindus and “other” Muslims (i.e. the upper groups in 
the social stratification for both religions) is also high, stable overall, declining in rural areas 
but increasing in urban areas. In reality upper Muslim groups do not seem to be advantaged 
compared with Muslim OBCs in wage employment. 
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Table 2.2 shows the pattern of wage employment for these social groups in 2011-12. It is 
apparent that wage differentials may be less important than inequality in access to good jobs. 
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes are concentrated in casual rural employment, where 
wages are low, while over half of upper caste Hindus are found in urban regular work. 
Muslims and OBCs are in an intermediate position. These differentials seem to be quite stable 
over time. In 1983 some 22 per cent of wage work among Scheduled castes and tribes was 
regular; by 2011-12 this had risen only to 26 per cent. Meanwhile, for all others the percent of 
regular work had risen from 46 to 58 per cent. 
 



















regular  9% 16% 23% 51% 22% 27% 34% 
Urban 
casual  5% 8% 9% 5% 16% 13% 7% 
Rural 
regular  10% 11% 15% 20% 14% 14% 20% 
Rural 
casual  76% 65% 53% 24% 48% 46% 39% 
        




The decomposition results (graph 2.13), using this broader social breakdown, gives much 
more influence to social group than we found when we only distinguished between SC/ST 
and others. In 2011 this accounted for 13 per cent of wage inequality overall, and 6 per cent in 
rural and 11 per cent in urban. There was some decline in the importance of social group in 
rural areas and overall between 2005 and 2012. It is interesting to note that social group is a 
more important factor in urban than in rural areas, since this is contrary to the common 
assumption that caste and religion play a larger role in rural society. 
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Because the influence of social group interacts with other factors, it is useful to break it down 
further. Table 2.3 gives the contribution of social group to wage inequality within regular and 
casual work, and for women and men. The results show that social group is a more important 
influence on wages in regular than in casual work in urban areas, while the reverse is true in 
rural areas. Since it is urban regular work that generates the highest incomes, this is a 
significant difference. Moreover, the effect is particularly strong for women, in both urban 
and rural areas. This no doubt is because of the type of regular work to which women have 
access. High caste women may well have access to professional jobs, while low caste women 
are more likely to be found in domestic service. In contrast, very few high caste women will 
be found in casual work. So the pattern of inequality results from the interaction between 
these three factors – sex, social group and type of work.  
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Table 2.3: Contribution of social group to Theil index by work type and sex (%) 
Work type Sex 2004-05 2011-12 
Rural 
regular 
All 4 3 
Female 8 6 
Male  4 3 
Rural 
casual 
All  6 4 
Female 2 2 
Male  6 4 
Urban 
regular 
All 8 7 
Female 12 10 
Male  8 6 
Urban  
casual 
All  4 3 
Female 3 3 
Male  4 3 
 
 
One of the difficulties of analysing the impact of social identity on inequality in India is that 
the pattern of castes and their hierarchy varies a great deal from state to state. In some states 
upper castes dominate the economic system, in others they are marginal. Backward classes are 
very important in some states. The proportion of Muslims varies greatly, while other religions 
are important in some states, such as Sikhs in Punjab and Christians in the North-east. By 
aggregating these different situations into a national picture, we are often mixing apples and 
oranges. In reality we need to look at the decompositions or ratios at the state level, where we 
can expect the effect to be stronger as a result of local factors. Data for three states, Bihar, 
Tamil Nadu and Punjab illustrate this point. 
 
The wage decomposition for Bihar, in table 2.4 below, supports this argument about local 
factors. The contribution of social group to the Theil index rises quite sharply in both rural 
and urban areas after 1993-94. This coincides with the political and economic rise of the 
middle castes in that state, though other factors may also be involved.8 
 
In Tamil Nadu, the contribution of social group to inequality in rural areas is close to 20 per 
cent, and quite constant over time. In urban areas it is much lower, and declining, from 5 per 
cent to 3. This is the classic pattern one would expect in a modernizing society, and very 
different from what is observed in Bihar. 
 
In Punjab, on the other hand, the contribution of social group is small in both urban and rural 
areas, with no obvious trend. This reflects the very different social make up of Punjab.  
Meanwhile, in Haryana, the contribution is larger than in Punjab (though still less than in 
Tamil Nadu and Bihar) and shows a distinct trend, higher in rural than in urban areas, and 
declining in both, to very low levels in urban areas. 
 
These statewise results show how risky it is to read too much into the national figures. The 
trends and patterns in different parts of the country are entirely different.  
 
8 This table, which is just an illustration, uses a different definition of social group. More regional level analysis 
would be needed to analyse these issues further. 
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Table 2.4: Wage decompositions by social group for selected states 
 
Bihar 
Year Theil index within between 
Rural    
1994 0.32 98% 2% 
2005 0.27 94% 8% 
2012 0.25 91% 9% 
Urban    
1994 0.34 96% 4% 
2005 0.52 95% 5% 
2012 0.45 82% 18% 
 
Tamil Nadu 
Year Theil index within Between 
Rural    
1994 0.26 81% 19% 
2005 0.27 83% 17% 
2012 0.19 82% 18% 
Urban    
1994 0.35 95% 5% 
2005 0.45 95% 5% 
2012 0.33 97% 3% 
 
Punjab 
Year Theil index within Between 
Rural    
1994 0.13 99% 1% 
2005 0.36 99% 1% 
2012 0.24 97% 3% 
    
Urban    
1994 0.22 99% 1% 
2005 0.39 99% 1% 
2012 0.44 >99% <1% 
 
Haryana 
Year Theil index within Between 
Rural    
1994 0.22 91% 9% 
2005 0.59 96% 4% 
2012 0.22 98% 2% 
    
Urban    
1994 0.31 97% 3% 
2005 0.28 >99% <1% 






To examine the contribution of education to wage differentials we used the following 
classification: 
1 Illiterate (no schooling) (32%) 
2 Below primary or literate without schooling (18%) 
3 Primary completed (14%) 
4 Middle school completed (14%) 
5 Secondary or higher secondary completed (16%) 
6 Graduates and other tertiary education (7%) 
Figures in brackets are the percentages of the population in each category in 2011-12, 
according to NSS data. 
 
Graph 2.14 shows the wage ratios between different educational categories for our four 
survey years. There is an interesting and very clear pattern. The premium to education is 
everywhere above 1, indicating that more education is reflected in higher wages. But the 
premium for all schooling levels below middle school is falling over time. Thus the wage 
premium for minimal schooling or literacy, as compared with illiteracy, has fallen from 45% 
to 13%, and there is now little additional gain from completing primary or middle school 
(only 6%). In contrast, the premium to secondary and college education (and above) is higher. 
The premium to secondary and higher secondary increased up to 2004-05, falling in 2011-12 
but still 47% compared with middle school. Meanwhile, the returns to tertiary education are 
increasing rapidly. The premium to college education over secondary/higher secondary has 
risen from 50% to 137% over the thirty year period. This shows the upward shift in the 
educational credentials demanded by the labour market. Secondary schooling is no longer 
sufficient to deliver a substantial wage premium; it is necessary to move up the scale. Even at 
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Decompositions of wages across education groups (graph 2.15) show that the between 
component is large (generally over 30 per cent), and increasing up to 2004-05 in both urban 
and rural areas, with a decline thereafter. As expected, the contribution is larger in urban than 
in rural areas, although the difference less than might be expected. This is in line with the 
usual results from decomposition of wages by education. This is sometimes interpreted as a 
direct effect of education, but the reality is not straightforward since access to education is 
differentiated by social group, sex and other factors, so that a difference in wages which is 
associated with differences in education may in fact reflect deeper social forces. We discuss 
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But the influence of education is very uneven across different segments of the labour market, 
as can be seen in table 2.5, which shows the contribution of the “between education groups” 
component for the Theil index, broken down by rural-urban, regular-casual work and sex. 
First of all, there is a huge difference in the contribution of education to wage differentials 
between regular and casual work. In regular work the contribution is in the range 20 to 45 per 
cent, whereas for most casual categories it is less than 5 per cent.  For women in casual work 
in rural areas, education makes virtually no contribution at all. Second, the contribution of 
education in regular work is as important for women as for men, on the whole, in fact greater, 
though the difference has been declining and has been reversed in urban areas. Third, the 
patterns in rural and urban areas are fairly similar, with a slight tendency for the contribution 
of education to be higher in urban areas. The difference is in line with expectations, but its 
size is not, since in the more complex urban labour market it might be thought that education 
would have a much larger influence than in rural areas.  
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Table 2.5: Contribution of education to Theil index by work type and sex (%) 
  1983 1993-94 2004-05 2011-12 
Rural regular All 21 32 23 20 
Female 20 43 31 26 
Male  21 30 22 20 
Rural casual All  4 7 9 4 
Female 1 2 1 1 
Male  2 4 5 2 
Urban regular All 28 29 33 24 
Female 45 37 31 24 
Male  27 29 32 33 
Urban  casual All  4 5 7 4 
Female 6 2 7 5 
Male  1 2 4 3 
 
 
Of course, education affects not only the wage directly but also the likelihood of gaining 
access to regular work. The overall influence of education on wages is then a combination of 
the way educational credentials affect access to regular work and the influence on wages 
within each type of work. To analyse this further it is necessary to look at occupational 
differences, which we explore to a limited extent in sections 4 and 7. 
 
2.5 Regional inequality 
 
As we saw in discussing the influence of social group, regional differences are important, and 
we need to consider regional inequality in more detail. There are substantial differences 
across India in levels of wages and incomes, which we need to take into account in our 
analysis. For this purpose we divide India into five regions. This was originally developed for 
comparisons with Brazil, where regional analysis has converged on a standard five-region 
breakdown. There is no comparable, consensual regional breakdown for India, so we have 
developed one specifically for this project. These regions consist of groups of states, on the 
basis of similarity in terms of output and expenditure per capita, poverty and urbanization. 
These regions are the Northeast including West Bengal, Assam and nearby hill areas; a group 
of poor states in the Centre-North of the country; the Northwest, covering a rather 
heterogeneous group of states from Kashmir to Rajasthan, including Delhi; the South and 
West, a relatively more industrialized region extending from Gujarat to Tamil Nadu; and the 
state of Kerala, which is so different from the others that it is better to keep it apart.9 
 
Graph 2.16 gives the ratios of mean wages, in rural and urban areas, between these different 
regions. The Centre, which is the poorest region in India, is considered as the reference point 
or the denominator of the wage ratio. These ratios are quite large in rural areas. The ratio was 
highest in Kerala in 1983 and has remained broadly constant over time. The Northwest also 
has a relatively high ratio, though it has been declining over time, and the same is true of the 
Northeast. The lowest ratio is observed in the south west, the industrial hub of India, where 
surprisingly rural wages are similar to those in the poor central region. The ratio however rose 
in 2012.  
 
In urban areas, there is much less difference in wages across regions. The highest ratio was 
observed in all years in the Northwest, where it has been rising. All regions followed a 
different pattern. The north east saw a marginally declining wage ratio, the South and West’s 
9 For more details see Barbosa et al. (2015). 
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ratio remained fairly stagnant and quite low and in Kerala the wage ratio first fell and then 
recovered.  
 
























































It can be argued from these patterns that the urban labour market is more integrated across the 
country than the rural labour market, and this is supported by the decomposition results in 
graph 2.17. We see that the between-region component has contributed 4 to 5 per cent to 
overall regional inequality, without much change over time. However, the contribution is 
much greater in rural than in urban areas. In rural areas, regional differences accounted for 
between 9 and 10 per cent of inequality until 2011-12, when it dropped to 7. On the other 
hand, the regional contribution to urban inequality has been small, of the order of 1 per cent, 





Graph 2.17: Decomposition of wage inequality by region: overall, rural and urban 
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It also appears that the regular labour market is more integrated across the country than the 
casual labour market, as can be seen from table 2.6, which summarizes a multilevel 
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decomposition, and gives the contribution to the Theil index of regional differences broken 
down by regular and casual work, rural and urban and sex. It confirms the greater regional 
heterogeneity of the rural labour market, but also shows that regional differences contribute 
much less to wage inequality for regular than for casual work (24% in rural casual work in 
2011-12 against 5% in rural regular; 14% in urban casual against 2% in urban regular). There 
is also a greater regional inequality in male than in female casual wages, and the gap seems to 
be growing over time. This is not true for urban regular wages, but the regional factor is much 
less important for this category. 
 
This suggests greater heterogeneity in rural areas than in urban, which seems quite plausible, 
and greater regional heterogeneity in casual labour markets than in regular, which is more of a 
surprise. The indication that regional inequality between urban areas has risen recently (graph 
2.17) also seems plausible, since the high growth of the Indian economy has not been evenly 
spread, although it is perhaps a surprise that the contribution of regional differences to urban 
inequality has been so small. 
 
Table 2.6: Contribution of regional differences to Theil index by work type and sex (%) 
  1983 1993-94 2004-05 2011-12 
Rural regular All 4 1 4 5 
Female 7 3 5 5 
Male  4 1 4 6 
Rural casual All  14 24 28 24 
Female 18 18 22 11 
Male  11 25 31 30 
Urban regular All 1 0 1 2 
Female 4 3 3 4 
Male  1 0 1 2 
Urban  casual All  7 10 18 14 
Female 12 8 13 9 
Male  6 10 23 18 
 
 
The experience of individual states shows that the time path of wage ratios varies greatly from 
one part of the country to another (Graph 2.18). Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Punjab and Haryana all 
show a different pattern. In Haryana, the wage ratio has been high since 1983, initially falling 
and then rising since the 1990s. Haryana’s neighbour, Punjab, shows precisely the opposite 
pattern, with wages in 2012 only 11 per cent above the national average. Wages in Bihar were 
low and have been falling further; while wages in Tamil Nadu, which were below the national 
average, have been close to the mean in the 2000s. The differences are such that we cannot 
interpret these outcomes as regional variations on a national pattern; the trends are so different 
that there are clearly distinct regional forces at work, and the trend at the national level may 
not be very meaningful. In reality while the decomposition above suggests that the 
contribution of regional to total inequality overall has not changed much, the regional 
composition of inequality has been changing substantially.  
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2.6 Summing up 
 
There are several insights to be retained from the above analysis, over and beyond the specific 
relationships identified. 
 
First, the wage decompositions do not stand on their own as a guide to the importance of each 
of these factors in inequality.  Each factor has not only a direct impact on wages, but also an 
indirect effect because of inequalities in access to work of different types. The declining 
contribution of gender to wage inequality has to be considered alongside the declining access 
of women to the labour market as a whole. There may not be much overt wage discrimination 
by caste or community, but caste and community networks are an important influence on 
employment opportunities. 
 
Second, there can be distinct trajectories for different categories and groups, which may not 
appear in an overall analysis. This is clearest for regional inequality, since there are large 
regional variations in development patterns; but it is also true for other groups. The increasing 
political influence of middle castes (OBCs) can change the nature and balance of caste 
inequality; or there may be particular educational qualifications which are important for 
access to higher paying jobs.  Decomposition is a rather blunt instrument to analyse these 
mechanisms. 
 
Third, there is a great deal of interaction between the five dimensions of inequality explored 
here. This can be seen in the selected multi-level decompositions presented above, but these 





3. Patterns of inequality in household expenditure  
 
The pattern of inequality of household expenditure may differ from that of wages for several 
reasons.  
 
First, households are composites in which there are several different sources of income, which 
have a joint effect on overall household expenditure. Gender inequality, for instance, is less 
visible because men’s and women’s wage incomes are combined. Differences in incomes at 
different ages are also reduced insofar as different generations are present in the same 
household. 
 
Second, there are additional sources of income beyond wage income. In particular, the NSS 
employment survey does not record income from self-employment. Income from capital or 
land, and remittances, are also not taken into account. 
 
Third, expenditure differs from income by the extent to which there is saving. In general, it is 
observed that saving is more unequally distributed, and expenditure more equally distributed 
than income. 
 
Fourth, there is a question of household size to take into account. In this section we use per 
capita household expenditure to adjust for household size. It should be noted, en passant, that 
a per capita adjustment is far from ideal if the aim is to measure equivalent levels of living 
across households of different sizes. Different household members have different needs and 
demands, and there are usually found to be some economies of household scale as well. 
However, this is the simplest and most widely used approach. 
 
The first, third and fourth of these would tend to make the distribution of expenditure less 
unequal than that of wages. The second is a mix of factors which would have diverse effects, 
though income from capital would tend to be less equally distributed than labour income. But 
overall it is not surprising that, as we found in section 1.1, the overall distribution of 
household expenditure per capita is distinctly less unequal than that of wages.  
 
While some expenditure data are collected by the NSS as part of the employment survey, the 
more detailed expenditure data form part of a separate expenditure survey using a different 
sample. We have preferred to use the latter, which appears to be more reliable, but this means 
that we cannot connect the detailed employment data with the expenditure data. Instead we 
use the more limited labour market information collected along with the expenditure survey. 
This permits us to break down households by (economic) type, based on the household’s main 
income source (most frequently the occupation of the household head). The household types 
in urban areas are self-employed, regular wage/salary earning, casual labour and others. The 
last group presumably includes employers and rentier households. In rural areas we have self-
employed outside agriculture, agricultural labour, other labour, self-employed in agriculture, 
and others. In 2011-12 we also can distinguish regular wage/salary work in rural areas. The 
household types are therefore different in rural and urban areas, though this is a reasonable 
reflection of the different economic systems. 
 
Graph 3.1 shows the ratios of mean per capita expenditure (MPCE) across these groups in 
urban (since 1993-94) and rural (since 1983) areas. 
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In urban areas, self-employed households have expenditure which is well above casual labour 
households, the difference rising between 1993-94 and 2004-05 and then falling. But their 
expenditure is lower than regular wage households, with a gap that widens slightly over time. 
“Other” households do best, both in absolute terms, and in terms of the trend. 
 
The ratio of expenditure in regular wage work households to that in casual labour households 
rises between 1993-94 and 2004-05 and then stabilizes at just over double. This picture is 
slightly more favourable to regular wage work households than is suggested by the wage data. 
 
Graph 3.1: Mean per capita household expenditure ratios between household types,  
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In rural areas, a more complex picture emerges. The self-employed, both in agriculture and 
non-agriculture, have expenditure per capita that is distinctly higher than agricultural labour 
households, but trending down, from a gap of 43 to 47% in 1983 to a gap of 29 to 36% in 
2011-12. Non-agricultural labour too starts well above agricultural labour, but the gap is down 
to 9 per cent in 2011-12. However, in 2011-12 a part of this group may be classified into the 
regular wage work category, which shows expenditure much higher than agricultural labour; 
if we consider the two together there may not be much trend. The “other” group, including 
landlords and the economically inactive, has much higher expenditure though this declines 
after 2004-05.  
 
Overall we see a tendency for the gaps between these categories to increase up to 2004-05 in 
urban areas, and then to stabilize or decline, consistent with our findings for inequality 
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overall. In rural areas there is some tendency for casual agricultural labour to catch up with 
other groups. Again, the expenditure data are broadly in line with the wage data. 
 
Graph 3.2 shows the decomposition of the Theil index of expenditure in terms of these 
household type categories. In rural areas, the between component rises from 6 per cent to 9 
and then falls to 7; in urban areas it rises from 8 per cent to 9. These figures are distinctly 
smaller than the contribution of to wage inequality of the difference between casual and 
regular work. This may just reflect the tendency of household income to depend on a wider 
variety of factors. The changes over time are small and may not be significant. 
 
Graph 3.2: Decomposition of the Theil index of inequality of MPCE across household 
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A second classification of households that is available for expenditure per capita is by socio-
religious group. A detailed breakdown is only available for 2004-05 and 2011-12.  Graph 3.3 
shows that in urban areas the groups that are clearly advantaged are Hindu “others” (basically 
upper castes) and other religions (i.e. other than Islam or Hinduism), both with expenditure 
about 80 per cent higher than Scheduled Castes and Tribes. This gap shows some sign of 
declining between the two years. Muslims have relatively low expenditure per capita, 
especially OBC Muslims (OBC Hindus do better than the average). 
 
In rural areas the broad pattern is fairly similar, but there are a few significant differences. In 
particular, the relative position of Scheduled Tribes is worse than in urban areas, while OBCs 
and Muslims do relatively better. The low expenditure levels of Scheduled Tribes – distinctly 
lower than Scheduled Castes – reflects their tendency to be concentrated in less developed 
rural areas of the country; in urban areas they do better, indeed slightly better than Scheduled 
Castes. The same pattern was found for wages.  In rural areas OBC Muslims have expenditure 
that is 20 to 40 per cent higher than STs, and 10 to 15 per cent higher than SCs; whereas in 
urban areas Muslims have the lowest expenditure level of all, even below SC and ST. The 
gaps mostly seem to be narrowing in rural areas, more so than in urban areas. 
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Graph 3.3: Ratios of expenditure per capita between socio-religious categories, 
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The decomposition of the Theil index for urban and rural combined (graph 3.4, middle two 
bars) gives 12 per cent of inequality due to differences between these groups in 2004-05, 
coming down to 10 per cent in 2011-12. This is quite high – higher than the contribution of 
household economic type, for example. What is more, somewhat contrary to expectations, the 
figure is higher in urban than in rural areas (11 per cent in the former in 2011-12 against 6 per 
cent in the latter), although it has been declining in both. These patterns are quite similar to 
those for wages. It is clear that whatever the mechanism involved, social group continues to 
play a significant role in expenditure inequality. 
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While the detailed breakdown is only available for 2005 and 2012, a more limited, and more 
conventional distinction, that between Scheduled Castes and Tribes on the one hand, and all 
others, can be analysed over a longer period of time (graphs 3.5 and 3.6). In both urban and 
rural areas, the ratio of expenditure of others to expenditure of SC/ST peaked in 2004-05, with 
a difference of over 30 per cent in rural and over 40 per cent in urban areas; and then 
declined. But over the long term, since 1983, there has not been much change – a slight 
increase in urban areas, a slight decrease in rural. This stability does not suggest that policies 
in favour of SC and ST, which have been in operation throughout this period, are having 
much effect. 
 
The decomposition results (graph 3.6) suggest that the contribution to overall inequality is of 
the order of 4 per cent, and like the wage ratios is fairly stable over time. It is slightly higher 
in rural than in urban areas (not shown). So the difference between SC/ST and the rest 
accounts for some four tenths of the overall contribution of social group to expenditure 
inequality using the more detailed breakdown above.   
 
Graph 3.5: Ratios of expenditure per capita between Others and SC/ST, 
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Graph 3.6: Decomposition of expenditure per capita by whether or not SC/ST 
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Third we can decompose expenditure by the education of the household head (graph 3.7). 
This, as expected, gives quite a strong relationship in urban areas, weaker in rural areas but 
still fairly substantial. In that respect the pattern is similar to that for wages, although the 
between component for expenditure is lower, especially in rural areas. 
 
Graph 3.7: Decomposition of expenditure per capita by education of household head, 




































Fourthly, we break down by region (graph 3.8), using the same five regions as for wages. In 
1983, apart from the poorer Centre region, which lagged significantly behind, there was little 
difference between regions in average expenditure, with slightly more variation in rural than 
in urban areas. Over time, it can be seen that the regional differences grew. The Centre lagged 
further behind, the North-east did only a little better, while the other regions gained, with the 
largest gains in Kerala. The general trend was similar in both urban and rural areas. 
 
This is confirmed by the decomposition results (graph 3.9). While the contribution of region 
to inequality was not large, it was larger in rural than in urban areas, and clearly rising in both, 
from 4 to 13 per cent in rural areas and from 2 to 4 per cent in urban areas. These results are 
somewhat different from those for wages. The greater contribution of region to inequality in 
rural than in urban areas is found in both, but in rural areas the wage decompositions gave 
some decline in the regional contribution after 2005, while the expenditure decomposition 
suggested a rise. The most likely explanation would lie in non-wage incomes – the 
implication is that in rural areas regional differences in non-wage incomes have increased 
faster than in wages in the most recent period. In urban areas, the regional contribution is 
somewhat higher than for wages than for expenditure, but the upward trend in the most recent 
period is found in both.  
 
Graph 3.8: Ratios of expenditure per capita between regions, urban and rural 
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These three factors – household type, social group and region – interact, and a multilevel 
decomposition provides additional insights. Table 3.1 shows the contribution of social group 
to the Theil index within each of the household type categories. In urban areas there is a clear 
pattern, for the contribution is distinctly larger for the self-employed than for the wage 
employed, and also for regular workers compared with casual workers among the wage 
employed. In other words, social group plays a significant role in the extent to which self-
employment provides a decent income. Networks of contacts, and perhaps also access to 
capital, may be playing a role here. It also clearly differentiates better- from less well-paid 
regular workers. Nevertheless, this pattern seems to weaken between the two dates in the 
survey, and is also distinctly weaker in rural areas (but in rural areas, self-employment mainly 
concerns cultivation, whereas in urban areas it covers a wide variety of occupations). 
 
Table 3.1: Percentage of Theil index of expenditure inequality explained by socio-
religious group within household type categories, rural and urban 
  2004-05 2011-12 
Rural All 8% 6% 
Self-employed  7% 6% 
Labourers 4% 4% 
Others 6% 4% 
Urban All  14% 11% 
Self-employed 17% 10% 
Regular worker 10% 8% 
Casual worker 5% 4% 
Others 10% 9% 
 
 
Like social group, education of the household head explains more of the variation in urban 
areas than rural (table 3.2). Within urban areas, it contributes more to inequality among 
regular workers than among the self-employed in 2004-05, but in other respects the pattern is 
not greatly different from that observed for social group, with less contribution to inequality 
among casual than regular workers and a decline in the contribution over time. Education and 
social group, then, function in a rather similar way, reflecting, of course, the tendency for 
advantaged social groups to also have higher levels of education. In rural areas the pattern is 
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less strong, with a larger contribution to inequality among the self-employed and the “other” 
group. This latter group (which also shows a fairly high figure in urban areas) includes 
employers, and presumably landlords and rentiers. 
 
Table 3.2: Percentage of Theil index explained by education of the household head 
within household type categories, rural and urban 
  2004-05 2011-12 
Rural All 8% 8% 
Self-employed  5% 7% 
Labourers 2% 4% 
Others 8% 13% 
Urban All  25% 17% 
Self-employed 19% 16% 
Regular worker 24% 14% 
Casual worker 9% 5% 
Others 16% 15% 
 
Unlike social group and education, region makes a much larger contribution to overall 
inequality in rural than in urban areas (table 3.3).  The largest contribution is found among 
labourers in rural areas and casual workers in urban areas. The small contribution to 
inequality among regular worker households in urban areas suggests a surprising homogeneity 
across regions. 
 
Table 3.3: Percentage of Theil index explained by region within household type 
categories, rural and urban 
  2004-05 2011-12 
Rural All 9% 13% 
Self-employed  9% 12% 
Labourers 13% 18% 
Others 9% 12% 
Urban All  3% 4% 
Self-employed 5% 7% 
Regular worker 2% 1% 
Casual worker 7% 12% 
Others 10% 6% 
 
 
To sum up these results for expenditure per capita, we can see some degree of consistency 
with the results of the wage analysis, notably with respect to decompositions by socio-
religious category and education. For both of these breakdowns, the main features of the 
analysis of wages are reproduced in the analysis of expenditure. But for other variables there 
are some differences. The pattern of expenditure by household type cannot be directly 
compared with the nearest equivalent for wages, namely the distinction between casual and 
regular work, but it is noteworthy that the contribution of household type to expenditure 
inequality is much smaller than is the contribution to wage inequality of the distinction 
between casual or regular work. This is surprising since the number of categories is larger for 
household type. The trend over time is also weaker. The regional pattern too shows some 
differences between household expenditure per capita and individual wages, particularly in 
rural areas, where regional differences were narrowing in the wage data and widening in the 
expenditure data.  
 
The most obvious source of these differences lies in the role of non-wage income, for which 
the pattern of inequality is no doubt different from that of wages – though we cannot observe 
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that directly with NSS data. It is nevertheless interesting that the impact of education (of the 
head) and social group seem to be broadly similar for both wages and expenditure. However, 
there are a variety of other factors at play, including household composition, employment 
levels of different household members, the relationship between income and expenditure and 
other factors. So it makes sense to analyse both wages and expenditure, which capture 
different dimensions of inequality. 
 
The other point is that, as for wages, we really need a multivariate analysis to explore the 
relative importance of the different factors discussed above. We turn to that in the next 
section. 
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4. Multivariate analysis 
 
4.1 Multivariate decomposition using Fields’ method 
 
This section combines all the categories we discussed in sections 2 and 3 into one unified 
multivariate analysis. The method used here is the Fields decomposition (Fields, 2002). In this 
method, a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression of log wages or log expenditure is 
conducted on various worker characteristics like age, education, social group, industry of 
work, etc. The coefficients obtained from this regression are used to calculate the share of 
each of these characteristics in the overall observed wage inequality.  
 
For this decomposition we used the following characteristics of the individuals concerned for 
the wage analysis: 
• Age 
• Rural-urban residence 
• Sex 
• Type of work (regular or casual) 
• Education (the six categories identified above) 
• Region (the five regions identified above) 
• Socio-religious group (the basic breakdown was as follows: Scheduled Castes, 
Scheduled Tribe, Muslim, other. This was available for all four years. In 2004-05 and 
2011-12 the more detailed categories identified above were also available. 
• Industry (standard 1-digit) 
• Occupation (standard 1-digit – note that the classification changed after 2005) 
 
With the exception of the first, and of the last two, these are the variables which were used in 
section 2. Age was added because it is generally included in earnings functions of this type as 
a proxy for experience; there is an expectation that productivity is a positive function of 
experience, so this should appear as a positive relation of wages with age. Industry and 
occupation were added because of the expectation that these are important influences on 
wages which need to be taken into account in a multivariate analysis.  
 
We proceeded as follows. First, for each year, we proceeded stepwise, estimating several 
specifications: 
• The first included all the variables used in section 2 (Spec.1) 
• The second added age (Spec.2) 
• The third added industry (Spec.3) 
• The fourth replaced industry with occupation (Spec.4) 
• The fifth included both industry and occupation (Spec.5) 
• For 2004-05 and 2011-12 we replaced the four category social group variable with the 
more detailed seven category variable (Spec.6). 
 These specifications were run first for all observations, with rural-urban an explanatory 
variable; and then for rural and urban areas separately. 
 
Table 4.1.1 gives the residuals – i.e. the unexplained portion – for each of these specifications 
for the first (1983) and last (2011-12) years. Several points can be noted: 
• First, the overall level of explanation is fairly high, between 32 and 58 per cent 
depending on the specification; 
• Second, the level of explanation is higher in urban areas than in rural; 
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• Third, the more complete specifications did increase the level of explanation, 
especially in urban areas, but most of the explanation was delivered by the first 
specification; 
• Fourth, there was some increase in the residuals between 1983 and 2012, especially in 
rural areas. 
 
Table 4.1.1: Fields decomposition for wages – residuals (unexplained percentage) by 
specification for 1983 and 2011-12 
  Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5  Spec. 6 
Overall             
  1983 47.0 44.8 42.8 42.8 42.0   
  2012 55.7 53.4 51.1 50.7 48.9 48.7 
Rural       
  1983 59.5 57.9 55.5 55.3 54.3   
  2012 67.9 66.7 63.7 64.7 62.7 62.3 
Urban       
  1983 55.0 49.1 46.2 46.5 45.2   
  2012 58.5 53.5 51.5 49.5 48.1 47.8 
 
 
We therefore observe that our model of wage inequality performs better in urban than in rural 
areas, and is also losing some explanatory power over time. But given that these are 
individual observations with random variation, errors and a variety of unobserved influences, 
the level of explanation can be considered fairly high. 
 
Graphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 present the results for all specifications for 2011-12, for all observations, 
and for rural and urban areas separately. The graph gives the percentage contribution of each 
variable to the decomposition, after excluding the residual.  
 
In the first, basic specification in Graph 4.1.1 it can be seen that education accounts for more 
than half of the explanation, far more than any other factor. The rural-urban division, sex, 
work type and region all account for of the order of 10 per cent, while social group 
(relsgroup) is negligible. Adding age in specification 2 improves the explanation to some 
extent but does not change this basic pattern. The addition of industry in specification 3 is 
largely at the expense of education, with only a small addition to the explanatory power. 
There is some interaction with work type, which is strengthened, and gender, which is 
weakened. However, when occupation is added instead of industry in specification 4, there is 
a substantial change. Occupation accounts for a quarter of explained inequality (as compared 
with 6 per cent for industry in the previous specification). Education remains the largest factor 
but is much weakened, as is work type (but of course occupation also to a large extent 
captures work type). There is little increase in explanatory power overall (table 4.1.1). When 
occupation and industry are included together in specification 5 it is occupation that 
dominates, with little separate effect of industry. The final specification, 6, uses the more 
detailed breakdown for socio-religious group. It can be seen that this does increase the 
contribution of this variable, but its influence remains limited.  
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Graph 4.1.1: Fields decomposition of wages, all observations, stepwise for 2011-12 
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Graph 4.1.2: Fields decomposition of wages, rural, stepwise for 2011-12 
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Graph 4.1.3: Fields decomposition of wages, urban, stepwise for 2011-12 
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There are considerable differences between urban and rural patterns in graphs 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. 
Education is far more important in urban than in rural areas, but is weakened by the 
introduction of occupation (as is the case for the sample as a whole). In contrast, in rural areas 
industry plays a more significant role, though still less than occupation. The rural pattern 
clearly reflects the importance of the difference between agriculture and other sectors, 
whereas in urban areas with a wider range of economic activities it is occupation that is more 
important than the industrial sector. Gender plays a more important role in rural than in urban 
areas, as does region, while age is more important in urban (no doubt reflecting the  greater 
possibilities of career progression in urban areas). Work type is similar in the two cases while 
the influence of social group is small in both, though not negligible with the wider definition 
in specification 6. 
 
How do we interpret these results? Education is the most important single factor. The fact that 
it is less influential in rural areas is a clear reflection of the relative lack of jobs in rural areas 
where educational qualifications are important. The relationship with occupation is also 
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strong, but its interpretation is more ambiguous. It could be argued that education provides 
access to occupation, so the occupational variables may merely be a proxy for education. But 
occupation appears to have a significant influence independent of education, while there can 
also be common factors which provide access to both education and good occupations. The 
fact that occupation is much more important than industry (agriculture apart) is also an 
indication of the importance of this factor. Occupation should be considered jointly with the 
type of employment relation (casual/regular), which also contributes significantly in all 
specifications, in both rural and urban areas. In fact, if the sample is divided into regular and 
casual workers (detailed results not given here), we find that the decomposition of inequality 
is quite different within the two groups. That for regular workers is closer to the overall 
decomposition, while for casual workers regional differences are extremely important, while 
the role of education is small.  
 
Among the other factors examined in section 2, we see that gender inequality is important in 
all specifications, especially in rural areas, and is not much weakened by the introduction of 
industry and occupation – i.e. there is a gender effect independent of occupation and industry. 
Regional differences are significant too, especially in rural areas. Both of these results mirror 
the bivariate results. But the influence of socio-religious group is weaker, suggesting that 
much of the observed relationship with caste and religion is the result of social inequality with 
respect to education and type of work, rather than directly on wages. 
 
Obviously, in the regression underlying the Fields decomposition, we are not considering the 
endogeneity of selection into the labour market as well as the opportunities and access 
(example, through social networks) that we do not observe but which influence wages. 
Differences in education levels or in labour market opportunities may be the result of caste or 
other hierarchies. In the next section we undertake some preliminary analysis of the 
determinants of education with this point in mind.  
 
The second way to look at these relationships is over time. Graphs 4.1.4, 4.1.5 and 4.1.6 give 
the decomposition for 1983, 1993-94, 2005-05 and 2011-12. In each case we take the full 
specification (specification 5 rather than 6 because the detailed social group breakdown is not 
available for 1983 or 1993-94).  
 
The overall decomposition in Graph 4.1.4 suggests that there have been some significant 
changes in the pattern of inequality over time, with some decline in the proportion of 
inequality explained by the model. First, it can be seen that the importance of occupation has 
increased, and that of industry has declined. It is certainly true that the Indian labour market 
has become much more complex over this 30 year period, including a much wider range of 
occupations. The decomposition suggests that this has been a major factor in the trend in 
inequality. It should be noted, that there was a change in the occupational classification  in 
2005, which may have influenced the results, but the increasing importance of occupation was 
visible prior to the change. If we combine occupation with work type (casual-regular) the total 
contribution to the decomposition has been relatively stable since 1993-94 at a little over 30 
per cent, but with a shift away from the casual-regular breakdown towards a wider notion of 
occupation. The declining importance of industry as such suggests that inter-industry 
differentials have become less important after occupational structures are taken into account. 
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Graph 4.1.4: Fields decomposition of wages, overall, 1983 to 2011-12 
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The other changes are smaller but there are some clear trends. The importance of the rural-
urban distinction has declined a little. The contribution of gender differences to overall 
inequality has also declined, which is in line with the bivariate results. Education shows little 
overall trend, while remaining the largest factor in each year.  
 
These patterns are not identical in urban and rural areas. The urban pattern (graph 4.1.6) is 
quite close to the overall pattern, with an increasing importance of occupation, a large and 
constant contribution from education, a declining contribution of work type and a sharply 
declining contribution of gender. Age is a significant factor too, but after rising up to 2005 it 
then declined. In rural areas, in contrast (graph 4.1.5) the contribution of gender is large and 
rising, the upward trend in occupation is less consistent and industry also plays a role, work 
type first increases and then declines, while region is important throughout the period 
(negligible in urban areas). There is no clear trend in the contribution of education, which is 
distinctly lower than in urban areas throughout the period.  Social group is not an important 
factor in either urban or rural areas, with the only sign of a trend in the slight strengthening in 
urban areas (but remaining small). 
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Graph 4.1.5: Fields decomposition of wages, rural, 1983 to 2011-12 
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Graph 4.1.6: Fields decomposition of wages, urban, 1983 to 2011-12 

































1983 1994 2005 2012
age gender worktype education




There are some important differences compared with the bivariate results. In rural areas, the 
multivariate analysis gives relatively greater importance to gender inequality (which is 
increasing rather than decreasing), and also to region, as compared with education and work 
type. On the other hand, social group is as weak is in the bivariate analysis. In urban areas 
again there is a greater importance given to gender inequality, but the multivariate analysis 
coincides with the bivariate in concluding that this impact is declining. The relative 
unimportance of region is confirmed, while social group does seem to be significant and of 
growing importance, but, as in the bivariate analysis, only with a more detailed breakdown 
including the OBCs. The preponderant influence of education in urban areas is confirmed, 
without any clear trend over time. 
 
It does seem that the impact of gender inequality comes out more clearly when other factors 
are also taken into account in the multivariate decomposition. For the impact of social group 
the conclusion of the bivariate analysis stands, that there are so many local factors that an all-
India analysis may miss the key relationships, so no strong conclusion should be drawn – 
except that the overall impact is weaker than one would expect from the political rhetoric.  
 
We also estimated the Fields decomposition for household expenditure per capita, although 
since there are less explanatory variables available, and they are characteristics of the 
household rather than of individuals, this is a more limited exercise which cannot be 
compared directly with the results for wages. We included the following independent 
variables: 
• Rural-urban residence 
• Household type (in the categories discussed in section 3) 
• Education of the household held (the six categories identified above) 
• Region (the five regions identified above) 
• Socio-religious group (the more detailed categories identified in section 3). 
• Industry (standard 1-digit) of the household head 
• Occupation (standard 1-digit) of the household head 
We have consistent information on household economic type only for 2004-05 and 2011-12 
and report only for those two years. All decompositions were done separately for rural and 
urban areas. 
 
Table 4.1.2: Fields decomposition for household expenditure per capita – residuals by 
specification for 2004-05 and 2011-12 
 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 
Rural    
  2004-05 73.2 72.6 72.7 
  2011-12 71.4 71.5 71.3 
Urban    
  2004-05 60.4 59.9 60.0 
  2011-12 61.9 61.2 61.0 
 
Three specifications are reported: the first included the core variables: household type, 
education, region and socio-religious group. The second added industry of the head, and the 
third replaced industry by occupation. Table 4.1.2 gives the residuals for each of these 
specifications for the two years in the two areas. It can be seen that (a) the level of explanation 
for expenditure was lower than for wages (i.e. the residuals are higher); and (b) there was very 
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little gained by adding industry or occupation to the decomposition. Nevertheless, in Graphs 
4.1.7 and 4.1.8 we give the decompositions for these three specifications in 2011-12. It can be 
seen that in neither urban nor rural areas do industry or occupation make a substantial 
contribution to the model, nor do they have much effect on the other variables, slightly 
reducing the impact of household type in both regions, and the impact of education in urban 
areas. In reality, the household type variable captures the essential occupational differences 
between households.  
 
Graph 4.1.7: Fields decomposition of per capita household expenditure, rural, 
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Graph 4.1.8 Fields decomposition of per capita household expenditure, urban, 
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In the light of the above results we only analyse the basic specification (Graph 4.1.9). In rural 
areas, we see that the most important factor is region, which increases substantially between 
the two years. Next in size is education, which declines slightly, followed by household type, 
which declines sharply, and social group, which declines slightly. The reasons for these trends 
are not clear, though they are not inconsistent with the bivariate results. It should be noted that 
the residual for rural areas is over 70 per cent, so our confidence in the model is less than for 
wages.  
 
In urban areas the results also show an increase in the importance of region, though here the 
education of the household head dominates the results, the changes are less sharp and the 
residuals are smaller at around 60 per cent.   
 
One interesting result is that socio-religious group is much more important for the expenditure 
decomposition than for wages, with the other major difference being the greater importance of 
regional differences. In both cases it is plausible that non-wage income would be an important 





Graph 4.1.9 Fields decomposition of per capita household expenditure, rural and 
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4.2 Multivariate analysis of education 
 
In the decompositions of wages, the most important factor is usually education, a result that is 
very common in this type of analysis. But this may be misleading, since the underlying 
assumption of independence among the explanatory variables does not hold. In reality, 
education is itself the outcome of a process of social differentiation. In particular, caste, sex, 
region, household income and wealth, education of the head and a number of other factors are 
important determinants of the educational levels attained by family members. When wage 
differentials are attributed to education, in reality they often have their roots in these social 
differentials. Standard economic theory would attribute wage differentials across education 
levels to productivity differentials due to investment in human capital. This effect is certainly 
present, but at the same time differentials in the labour market reproduce the prevailing social 
hierarchies, and the relative importance of productivity and structural inequality is not easy to 
ascertain. 
 
We cannot solve this problem here, but we can at least explore how far education levels are 
associated with some of these more structural factors. Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 give the results 
of a set of Probit estimates in which the dependent variable is alternately whether individuals 
have education (1) below and above college and (2) below and above secondary and higher 
secondary school, restricted to ages 20 to 29, for urban and rural areas respectively. This 
selection is made because differentiation is now occurring mainly in the upper echelons of the 
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education system, and the age group 20 to 29 gives an indication of what was happening in 
the ten to 15 years before the date of the survey (since the education of older adults reflects 
previous periods). The independent variables are socio-religious category (either limited to 
the identification of ST and SC, before 2005, or the more detailed breakdown used above, for 
the most recent two years); sex; and region. In rural areas land ownership is also available. 
These estimates use the NSS employment surveys. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Probit estimates: Dependent variable, Education level of population aged 
20 to 29, urban 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variables 
College education or above (value 1) or 
not (value 0) 
secondary education or above (value 1) or 
not (value 0) 
 1983 1994 2005 2012 1983 1994 2005 2012 
         
Non ST/SC (base: 
ST/SC) 0.743*** 0.658***   0.687*** 0.660***   
 (0.00125) (0.000941)   (0.000780) (0.000645)   
Socio-religious group 
(excluded group: ST)         
Hindu SC   -0.158*** -0.0435***   -0.166*** 0.0148*** 
   (0.00170) (0.00122)   (0.00137) (0.00106) 
Hindu OBC   0.186*** 0.311***   0.169*** 0.372*** 
   (0.00161) (0.00115)   (0.00131) (0.00101) 
Hindu Other caste   0.711*** 0.675***   0.832*** 0.814*** 
   (0.00159) (0.00115)   (0.00131) (0.00103) 
Muslim – OBC   -0.428*** -0.325***   -0.363*** -0.260*** 
   (0.00195) (0.00132)   (0.00152) (0.00112) 
Muslim – non OBC   -0.0108*** -0.240***   -0.0271*** -0.108*** 
   (0.00173) (0.00131)   (0.00140) (0.00112) 
Other religion   0.691*** 0.623***   0.752*** 0.787*** 
   (0.00179) (0.00134)   (0.00154) (0.00128) 
Female(base: male) -0.238*** -0.0721*** -0.0515*** -0.0838*** -0.364*** -0.309*** -0.164*** -0.0980*** 
 (0.000637) (0.000531) (0.000434) (0.000361) (0.000490) (0.000433) (0.000389) (0.000347) 
Region (base: 
Northwest)         
Centre -0.00763*** -0.0332*** 0.139*** -0.0679*** -0.0998*** -0.123*** 0.0542*** -0.124*** 
 (0.000981) (0.000842) (0.000742) (0.000629) (0.000794) (0.000717) (0.000664) (0.000605) 
North east+ WB -0.0916*** -0.136*** -0.144*** -0.181*** -0.0318*** -0.137*** -0.119*** -0.275*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00107) (0.000922) (0.000811) (0.000967) (0.000892) (0.000807) (0.000772) 
South west  -0.223*** -0.241*** 0.116*** 0.0338*** -0.0961*** -0.144*** 0.127*** 0.105*** 
 (0.000904) (0.000777) (0.000674) (0.000564) (0.000711) (0.000651) (0.000600) (0.000552) 
Kerala -0.260*** -0.373*** 0.394*** 0.308*** -0.273*** -0.136*** 0.397*** 0.441*** 
 (0.00219) (0.00172) (0.00141) (0.00130) (0.00167) (0.00131) (0.00130) (0.00134) 
         
Constant -1.684*** -1.469*** -1.168*** -0.810*** -0.799*** -0.488*** -0.319*** -0.00608*** 
 (0.00139) (0.00110) (0.00166) (0.00122) (0.000923) (0.000807) (0.00136) (0.00109) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0338 0.0252 0.0624 0.0556 0.0378       0.0341 0.0797 0.0709 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Without discussing these results in detail here, since that is not the main focus of this paper, it 
can be seen that there are powerful effects of caste, sex, religion and region. In both urban 
(table 4.2.1) and rural (table 4.2.2) areas the probability of obtaining these higher levels of 
education are much higher for upper (Hindu) castes and religions other than Islam and 
Hinduism, with Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims disadvantaged to differing 
degrees in rural and urban areas. Women have a much lower probability than men of higher 
education levels in both areas, and there are also strong regional effects, with Kerala well 
ahead, and the Northeast and the rural Centre well behind. In rural areas land owned per 
capita was also highly significant (no comparable variable was available for urban areas).10  
10 Since education levels are attained prior to the date of the survey, and may influence household income or 
wages, we have a problem of simultaneity if we use the latter variables in these estimates. This can also be to 
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Table 4.2.2 Probit estimates: Dependent variable, Education level of population aged 
20 to 29, rural 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent 
variables 
College education or above 
(value 1) or not(value 0) 
secondary education or above 
(value 1) or not(value 0) 
2005 2012 2005 2012 
Socio-religion 
(base: ST) 
    
Hindu SC 0.289*** 0.389*** 0.346*** 0.359*** 
 (0.00111) (0.000884) (0.000666) (0.000530) 
Hindu OBC 0.442*** 0.549*** 0.562*** 0.602*** 
 (0.00101) (0.000803) (0.000602) (0.000477) 
Hindu Other caste 0.815*** 0.971*** 1.023*** 1.134*** 
 (0.00103) (0.000829) (0.000633) (0.000526) 
Muslim – OBC 0.0934*** 0.0588*** 0.153*** 0.161*** 
 (0.00158) (0.00120) (0.000986) (0.000718) 
Muslim – non OBC 0.229*** 0.458*** 0.355*** 0.554*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00114) (0.000830) (0.000709) 
Other religion 0.649*** 0.825*** 0.703*** 0.904*** 
 (0.00135) (0.00116) (0.000899) (0.000843) 
Female(base: male) -0.363*** -0.264*** -0.492*** -0.418*** 
 (0.000434) (0.000355) (0.000288) (0.000255) 
Regions (base: 
Northwest) 
    
Center -0.0746*** -0.315*** -0.128*** -0.182*** 
 (0.000724) (0.000554) (0.000490) (0.000425) 
North east+ WB -0.268*** -0.382*** -0.195*** -0.205*** 
 (0.000960) (0.000739) (0.000611) (0.000535) 
South west  0.0889*** -0.0657*** 0.0995*** 0.184*** 
 (0.000732) (0.000565) (0.000502) (0.000443) 
Kerala 0.813*** 0.702*** 0.810*** 0.894*** 
 (0.00106) (0.000952) (0.000837) (0.000847) 
Ln landowned pc 0.0514*** 0.0580*** 0.0734*** 0.0766*** 
 (9.97e-05) (8.21e-05) (6.65e-05) (5.81e-05) 
Constant -2.123*** -1.839*** -1.344*** -0.987*** 
 (0.00122) (0.000949) (0.000765) (0.000622) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0819 0.0861 0.1002 0.1058 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
This strongly supports the thesis that education levels are endogenous. This implies that the 
effects of education observed in the multivariate decomposition are an overestimate of its 
direct impact. In reality a more complex model is required which captures the structural 
determinants of inequalities in education as well as inequalities in wages or expenditure, and 
it cannot be assumed that the observed direct relationship between education and wages or 
expenditure will be reproduced if there is an exogenous change in education due to state 
policy.  
some extent true of wealth, but wealth (especially land ownership) is much more stable over time and less 
influenced by current educational levels.  
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5. Relationship between income and expenditure  
 
In India, the measurement of inequality at the household level most frequently relies on 
expenditure data, usually from the National Sample Survey. Income would be a better 
measure for many purposes, but there is no regular national survey that collects income data. 
 
Since this paper is intended to be used for a comparison of inequality in India and Brazil, this 
is a problem. In Brazil, the measurement of inequality most frequently relies on income data, 
often from the PNAD (National Household Sample Survey). There is an expenditure survey, 
but it is less frequent, and the PNAD survey is needed to link household income with the 
labour market data. 
 
This difficulty does not apply to wage data. A broadly comparable analysis of wage inequality 
is possible in the two countries, along the lines of that above. But it is also desirable to 
examine income inequality at the household level. Household income reflects the patterns of 
employment and wages of all household members, income from own business or self-
employment, returns on capital, land and other assets and public and private transfers. In 
Brazil we can aggregate different these income sources within the household to calculate total 
household income. We cannot do this in India using the NSS, which provides only an estimate 
of household expenditure, along with some components of household income (notably wages, 
but not self-employment incomes or capital incomes). 
 
So to compare household level inequality in India and Brazil we usually find ourselves 
comparing income data with expenditure data. What biases does this introduce?  
 
A first answer to this question can be given by comparing the distribution of household 
income and household expenditure distribution within India. The Indian Human Development 
Survey carried out by the NCAER in 2004-05, the same year as the 61st round of the National 
Sample Survey, collected both income and expenditure data, and has been used along with the 
NSS to make this comparison. We calculate Gini and Theil indices for wages (NSS), for 
household expenditure (both NSS and NCAER surveys), and for household income 
(NCAER). 
 
Graph 5.1 gives the results.  
 
It can be seen that 
1. The Gini and Theil indices are quite consistent with each other in terms of the patterns 
for the different variables. 
2. Expenditure inequality as measured in the NCAER survey is similar to, but slightly 
higher than in the NSS survey. 
3. Income inequality, as measured by the NCAER survey, is much higher than 
expenditure inequality: a Gini of about 0.54 for income, against 0.37 (NSS) or 0.40 
(NCAER) for expenditure. In fact, the Gini coefficient of income inequality in 2004-
05 is not much different from the corresponding figure for Brazil, although the latter 
country is usually regarded as much more unequal. 
4. Inequality of wages is also higher than inequality of expenditure (in the NSS survey). 
5. Inequality of wages in the NSS data is almost as high as inequality of income in the 
NCAER survey (the difference is larger for the Theil index than for the Gini 
coefficient). We would normally expect the distribution of wages to be less unequal 
than the distribution of income, since non-wage income is, on the whole, less equally 
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distributed than wage income, so this is in line with expectations. However the 
difference is quite small. 
 































Sources: NSS 61st round unit level data (left hand two bars) and NCAER Human Development Survey 2004-05  
(right hand two bars)  
 
 
These results confirm that the different measures of inequality do not give identical results. As 
we saw in section 1 the trends can also be different; the trend of inequality in wages was fairly 
similar to that in expenditure in urban areas, but there were significant differences in rural 
areas, with inequality of expenditure rising in the most recent period (after 2004-05) when 
inequality of wages was falling.  
 
 Since a second NCAER survey has been carried out in 2011-12, it will be possible in due 
course to explore whether changes over time in the inequality of income and of expenditure 
are similar. The 2011-12 data were not available at the time of writing. 
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6. The functional distribution of income 
 
In India, the functional distribution of income is heavily influenced by two important aspects 
of economic structure. The first is the share of the “unorganized” sector in GDP. The 
unorganized sector, according to the conventional Indian definition, comprises all small and 
household enterprises (small being less than 10 workers with electrical power, and less than 
20 without). In 1980-81, the unorganized sector accounted for 68% of GDP. Even in 2007-08 
it accounted for 57%. A part of reason lies in the importance of agriculture in GDP, which 
accounted for 38% in 1980, although it was down to 16% in 2010. The second is the 
importance of self-employment, which accounted for 58 per cent of all employment in 1983, 
and was still 52 per cent in 2011-12. These two facts are closely related, since self-
employment occurs mainly in the unorganized sector, and a majority of employment in the 
unorganized sector consists of self-employment. Of course, much self-employment is in 
agriculture, which has declined, but the decline in work in agriculture is much greater than the 
decline in self-employment, so some self-employment in agriculture has clearly been 
substituted by self-employment in other sectors (mainly tertiary). 
 
The importance of this lies in the fact that returns to labour and returns to capital (or land) are 
very difficult to separate for the self-employed. In the national accounts, the conventional way 
to handle this is through the category of mixed income, i.e. income which is a mix of returns 
to labour, capital and land. Graph 6.1 shows that over the period from 1980 to 2008, the share 
of mixed income declined fairly steadily, from over 54% to less than 44%, with a period of 
relative stability between 1986-7 and 1993-94. This decline of 11 percentage points 
corresponds fairly closely to the similar decline in the share of the unorganized sector in 
GDP.11  
 
Of the remaining components of factor shares, wages were fairly stable around 38% up to 
1991-92. They then declined unevenly to 34 per cent in 2007-08. But the large change was in 
the profit share, which rose from 8 per cent in 1980-81 to 22 per cent in 2007-08. Most of this 
increase occurred in the period after liberalization in 1991-92.  
 
Since much mixed income derives from self-employment, a substantial proportion of mixed 
income represents returns to labour. So a good part of the decline in mixed income certainly 
corresponds to a decline in returns to labour. So these overall figures show a substantial shift 
in factor incomes away from labour to capital.  
 
This can be seen more clearly when we look at the organized sector alone (Graph 6.2), which 
does not record mixed income in the national accounts. Over the period from 1980-81 to 
2007-08 the wage share declined from 74 per cent to 48 per cent, with the bulk of the decline 
again occurring after 1992-93. This did not occur in the unorganized sector (not shown), 
where the share of wages rose slightly from 20 to 24 per cent, with a corresponding decline in 
mixed income. This no doubt reflects a decline in the share of agriculture within the 
unorganized sector, and may be due to formerly self-employed small farmers moving into 
wage work in the urban unorganized sector. 
11 Due to a change of definitions in the national accounts we cannot extend this analysis beyond 2008. 
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Graph 6.1: Factor shares, whole economy, India, 1980-81 to 2011-12 
Share of factors - organized + urorganized
8.27 9.90 10.58 10.46 10.35 10.57 10.86 10.24 11.02 11.62 11.57 11.93 11.78
15.06 16.34 17.12 17.12 16.51 16.37 16.35 15.75 16.89 18.62 18.79 19.17 19.52 19.52
22.10
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38.51 38.42 39.33 39.93 38.53 38.53 38.39 38.01 37.77
35.00 35.16
36.30 35.23 36.59 36.61 37.38 38.32 37.55
37.14 36.12 36.75 36.32 36.32 34.24
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Operating surplus compensation Mixed income Net Domestic Product (1999-00 prices):Total value (crores)
 





Graph 6.2: Factor shares, organized sector, India, 1980-81 to 2011-12 
Share of factor income -organized sector
74.33 70.45 69.87 70.08 71.16 70.71 70.97 72.52 70.04 68.82 68.62 67.80 67.91
59.69 56.78 57.29 56.25 58.18 58.94 59.68 61.56 59.32 56.45 55.37 54.88 54.14 54.14 48.49
25.67 29.55 30.13 29.92 28.84 29.29 29.03 27.48 29.96 31.18 31.38 32.20 32.09



























































































































































































compensation Operating surplus Net Domestic Product:Organised Sector (1999-00 prices):value (crores)
 




The mechanisms by which this occurred can be seen in more detail for the manufacturing 
sector, for which the Annual Survey of Industry provides data (Graph 6.3). The profit share in 
manufacturing industry was fairly stable in the 1990s at around 20 per cent. After 1992-93 it 
rose to a plateau of around 30 per cent before rising sharply to between 50 and 60 per cent in 
the 2000s. Meanwhile, the share of wages to workers, over 30 per cent in the 1980s, dropped 
steadily after 1990 to not much more than 10 per cent. ASI data distinguishes payments to 
workers from “emoluments” to technical, managerial and professional staff. This too 
declined, but much less sharply than payments to workers, from 20 to 25 per cent in the 1980s 
to just under 20 percent in the 2000s. There was also a shift from rental and interest payments 
to profits after 2002-03, which appears to reflect the increased ability of organized sector 
firms to generate capital internally.   
 
Graph 6.3: Factor shares in the organized manufacturing sector 
Wage, profit and rent shares in value added, organized 
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Profit share
 
Source: Annual Survey of Industry 
 
 
Apart from the decline in rent and interest, the increase in the profit share derived from two 
principal factors. The first was a relatively slow rise in total (organized sector) employment 
compared with the growth in output (Graph 6.4). It was this that led to concerns in India about 
“jobless growth”. The second was a relatively slow rise in daily wages and salaries (Graph 
6.5). Indeed, for wage workers there was little increase at all. Real wages of workers in 
organized manufacturing rose up to the beginning of the 1990s, but thereafter showed little 
change until the mid 2000s. Wages (salaries) of technical and professional workers, on the 
other, after flattening out in the 1990s, rose steadily thereafter, so the ratio between them and 
unskilled workers doubled, from twice in the 1980s to four times around 2010. There was 
therefore an increasing differentiation among the manufacturing workforce. After 2005, 





















































































Source: Annual Survey of Industry 
 
 
Graph 6.5: Real wages in organized manufacturing, waged and salaried workers 





















































































The main shift in factor incomes away from wages and towards profits occurred in the wake 
of the economic liberalization of the early 1990s. But the dynamics were clearly complex, 
with an initial rise in the profit share occurring during a period when there was little change in 
wages (but rising incomes for professional and technical workers); and a further rise in the 
profit share after 2005 which was partly at the expense of rent and interest, and only partly at 
the expense of wages, which started to rises significantly in real terms as the growth of the 




7. Occupation and inequality: Patterns of access and remuneration 
 
As we have seen in the multivariate decompositions above, occupational differences account 
for a substantial fraction of wage inequality. Most of this paper has focused on wages, but 
occupational inequality is important not only because different occupations pay different 
wages, but also because occupations vary greatly in their intrinsic interest, stability and social 
valuation. 
 
There are three main aspects to this issue: the pattern of access to different occupations; 




There are considerable differences in occupational opportunity between men and women, 
between different social groups, and between other population categories. These can in part be 
traced to skills and qualifications, in part to the functioning of networks of patronage and 
control, and in part to various forms of discrimination.  
 
Mamgain (2015) has compiled occupational data from the same four NSS rounds that we 
have used in this paper.12 This shows that compared with men, a higher proportion of women 
are found in agricultural occupations and personal services (Table 7.1). Women are less well 
represented than men among white collar and executive positions and among production 
workers. Over time, women have improved their position compared with men in professional 
and technical occupations, and to some degree in clerical occupations. However, this refers to 
the share of these occupations among working women, and – as we saw in section 2 – the 
proportion of women in economic activity is much lower than that of men and showing some 
tendency to decline. 
 
Table 7.1: Occupational pattern by sex, 1983 and 2011-12  
National Classification of 














Professional, technical and related 
workers 3.7 5.7 2.4 6.5 
Working proprietors, administrative, 
executive and managerial workers 1.7 8.1 0.5 3.7 
Clerical and related workers 4.2 3.3 0.8 1.5 
Sales workers 6.9 7.8 2.8 2.8 
Service workers 3.9 3.7 4.0 5.7 
Farmers, fishermen, hunters, 
loggers and related workers 60.3 41.5 78.7 58.2 
Production and related workers, 
transport equipment operators and 
labourers 19.4 30.1 10.9 21.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: NSS (Mamgain, 2015) 
12 It should be noted that the occupational classification changed in 2005, so that a complex and in some respects 
imperfect mapping exercise is required to align occupational after 2005 with occupational categories before that 
date. This is discussed in Mamgain (2015). 
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A similar analysis of the composition of occupations across social groups (SC, ST, Muslims 
and others) shows clearly a concentration of Scheduled Castes in unskilled labour, along with 
some other specific, generally low status or low skilled occupations – domestic service, 
mining, sweepers and cleaners, painters. There is a larger than average proportion of SCs in 
all of these occupations. Scheduled Tribes have a somewhat similar profile, with a 
particularly high concentration among unskilled labourers. Muslims too have a distinctive 
occupational pattern. They are underrepresented in technical, professional and white collar 
occupations, but are more frequently found in small business, and in specific skilled or semi-
skilled occupations such as tailoring, work in the food and tobacco industries, transport and 
some other manufacturing sub-sectors. These differences appear to be more persistent over 
time than those between women and men, for there is little change in the caste and 
community pattern over the period between 1983 and 2011-12. 
 
This social distribution of occupations in part reflects a tendency for occupational 
opportunities to be transferred from one generation to the next. There is relatively little 
research on intergenerational mobility in India, but what there is tends to suggest that mobility 
is low. Motiram and Singh (2012) find that there is considerable persistence in occupations 
over generations, comparing sons with fathers, in both rural and urban areas. This is 
particularly strong at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, and among Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes. These groups are also most vulnerable to downward mobility, if fathers have 
relatively higher status occupations. Majumder’s more detailed study (2010) found that upward 
mobility across generations is moderate for educational level but low for occupation. While the 
educational levels of the second generation are higher those of their parents (in 2004), this is only 
imperfectly reflected in the occupational mobility matrix. People are stuck in their parental 
occupational class and whatever movement occurs is mostly among upper classes. Reddy and 
Swaminathan’s study (2014) of 10 villages suggested that the main vehicle for 
intergenerational occupational mobility for people in rural India is migration to urban or semi-
urban areas. Within the villages intergenerational occupational mobility was low, particularly 
among big farmers and manual workers. Scheduled Caste men who remained in the villages 
were unable to move out of rural manual employment. 
 
(ii) Change over time 
The second aspect of occupational inequality is change in occupational patterns over time. 
With economic growth and structural change, some occupations are expanding and others are 
contracting. Depending on the size and relative remuneration of each occupational category, 
the result may be increasing or decreasing inequality measured across the workforce as a 
whole. In India in recent years it has been professional, technical, administrative and 
managerial occupations that have been expanding fastest. These are the highest paid 
occupations, and while they only constitute only a small fraction of all employment it has 
risen from less than 5 per cent in 1983 to 13 per cent in 2011-12, increasing the size of a 
relatively well paid group.  
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Table 7.2: Annual growth rates (%) of number of workers by occupational group 








Professional, technical and related workers 4.0 4.1 6.3 
Working proprietors, administrative, executive 
and managerial workers 8.3 7.8 10.3 
Clerical and related workers 3.9 1.3 1.4 
Sales workers 4.6 3.8 -2.4 
Service workers 1.8 4.3 0.2 
Farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers and 
related workers 1.9 0.8 -2.2 
Production and related workers, transport 
equipment operators and labourers 3.7 4.0 4.7 
Total 2.6 2.1 0.6 
Source: NSS (Mamgain, 2015). 
 
 
There has also been a substantial increase in the share of production, transport and related 
workers, especially of unskilled labourers. This is a much lower income category. The growth 
in this group corresponds to a large extent to the decline in agricultural occupations, but it 
seems that outside agriculture growth has been concentrated in the highest and the lowest 
paying occupations, widening wage inequality overall. 
 
(iii) Occupational wages 
The third aspect of this issue is change in the relative wages and incomes of the occupations 
concerned. Graph 7.1 plots the ratio to the mean of the wages for 33 occupational categories 
for male, regular workers, using data from the NSS compiled by R.P. Mamgain.  
 
The most obvious point is that wage differentials are largely maintained over time, as can be 
seen from the close relationship between wage ratios in each period. The second point, if we 
compare observations with the line at 45 degrees, is that at the lower wage levels, the ratios 
are rather similar to 1993-94 in both 2004-05 and 2011-12 – perhaps averaging slightly below 
the line in 2004-05. However, at the higher wage levels the most wage ratios are above the 
line. This tendency for the rise in the wage ratio to be correlated with the wage ratio in 1993-
94 implies that wage differentials have increased. However there is not much difference in the 




Graph 7.1: Wage ratio (compared with the mean) for two digit occupations, 2004-05 






















A similar pattern can be observed for female regular workers (graph 7.2). The scatter is wider, 
and the sample is smaller because there are fewer women in this category. However, once 
again at the higher wage levels the tendency is for the wage ratio to rise, while at lower wage 
levels the tendency is for it to fall, so occupational wage inequality is widening.  
 
While we also have data for casual workers, casual work is very small or atypical for the 
majority of occupations, so we cannot undertake the same analysis for this category. As was 
noted earlier, the ratio of casual to regular wages fell until 2004-05, but rose in the period up 
to 2011-12. 
 
Graph 7.2: Wage ratio (compared with the mean) for two digit occupations, 2004-05 



























Overall, then, we can conclude that occupational factors did contribute to the widening of 
wage inequality in the last thirty years, both as a result of the rising share of higher wage 
occupations, and as a result of widening occupational wage differentials. This tendency 
towards growing inequality may have been partially offset by increased access for women to 
higher wage occupations, but the differences in opportunities among castes and communities 
do not show any similar tendency to decline. 
 
 
8. Concluding comments 
 
This paper provides some evidence on key dimensions of inequality in India and how they 
have changed over the last thirty years. We have looked at the overall degree and pattern of 
inequality in wages and in household expenditure, and at some of the key dimensions of this 
inequality, in terms of labour market structures, gender differentiation, differing opportunities 
across social and religious groups, returns to education and the regional pattern of growth and 
development.   
 
The picture that emerges is complex. Inequalities take many forms and affect groups of the 
population in different ways. Nor are the relationships consistent in different parts of India, so 
what is observed at the national level may be an amalgam of different patterns in different 
regions.  
 
When we look at different dimensions of inequality together, we find interactions which 
modify our understanding of the role of each dimension separately. The multi-level 
decompositions suggest, for instance, that caste and community differences are weakened 
when other factors such as education and occupation are taken into account, while gender 
differences persist. But this also implies a need to understand the indirect influence of caste 
and community through their impact on opportunity. All of these factors are intertwined, 
highlighting the need for caution in interpretation. 
 
There is clearly a need for additional analysis of some major issues, in particular the 
contribution of regional differences and occupational patterns to inequality. A more complex 
model would be required to understand the role of education.  
 
Finally, this work has been done in the context of a comparative study between India and 
Brazil. It is likely that this comparison will itself bring new perspectives which can inform the 
analysis in each country.  So these results are best seen as an input to an as yet unfinished 
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Section 2.1: Regular and casual wages: Theil decomposition, means and ratios 









Wage ratio Regular  Casual  
Rural 
1983 0.43 81% 19% 15.35 6.72 0.46 
1994 0.29 66% 34% 55.26 20.82 0.34 
2005 0.37 68% 32% 133.82 48.88 0.32 
2012 0.28 76% 24% 299.00 138.84 0.38 
Urban 
1983 0.30 82% 18% 23.11 9.51 0.40 
1994 0.31 78% 22% 75.81 28.73 0.36 
2005 0.44 86% 14% 193.68 69.39 0.36 
2012 0.45 88% 12% 450.37 171.48 0.37 
Note: Wages in this section are in current prices, 
 
 
Section 2.2 Gender:  Theil decomposition and mean wages 
 





















1983 0.43 92% 8% 15.98 11.16 7.76 4.78 10.20 5.46 
1994 0.29 89% 11% 58.75 34.57 23.68 15.58 31.32 17.07 
2005 0.37 92% 8% 144.94 85.54 55.15 34.64 78.81 42.67 
2012 0.28 95% 5% 322.39 201.46 149.70 103.25 192.97 123.15 
Urban 
1983 0.30 94% 6% 23.96 16.80 11.07 5.36 21.15 11.82 
1994 0.31 96% 4% 78.33 61.47 32.59 18.69 66.47 42.94 
2005 0.44 98% 2% 203.29 152.95 75.70 44.31 173.96 126.72 




Section 2.3 Socio-religious group: Theil decomposition and mean wages 
 
(i) SC/ST compared with all others 
Sector 






 Mean wages 
 
SC/ST   Others 
Rural 
1983 0.43 97% 3% 7.19 9.93 
1994 0.29 97% 3% 22.74 30.01 
2005 0.37 97% 3% 56.41 78.08 
2012 0.28 98% 2% 152.43 193.34 
Urban 
1983 0.30 97% 3% 14.27 20.87 
1994 0.31 97% 3% 45.24 65.95 
2005 0.44 97% 3% 118.89 177.72 
2012 0.45 98% 2% 291.80 416.84 
 


















Rural 2005 0.37 92% 8% 48.78 57.97 66.11 107.62 77.24 66.51 90.61 
2012 0.28 94% 6% 130.69 155.68 175.35 251.04 170.53 178.00 228.14 
Urban 2005 0.44 89% 11% 134.47 111.31 133.25 231.98 102.67 119.95 194.92 
2012 0.45 89% 11% 313.98 275.06 330.15 562.41 228.89 256.80 474.55 
 
 





























1983 0.43 74% 26% 6.51 8.39 9.86 13.21 21.84 30.30 
1994 0.29 63% 37% 19.45 24.77 28.13 34.13 56.65 91.34 
2005 0.37 61% 39% 44.66 55.31 60.66 71.67 114.76 229.30 
2012 0.28 68% 32% 127.20 141.04 146.85 165.99 222.13 467.89 
Urban 
1983 0.30 66% 34% 10.47 14.26 14.64 17.92 26.24 39.05 
1994 0.31 62% 38% 31.14 39.54 41.03 49.63 75.43 121.72 
2005 0.44 61% 39% 67.49 84.24 90.41 103.29 168.71 326.22 



















 & west Kerala 
Rural 
1983 0.43 91% 9% 14.15 7.38 12.34 7.36 15.07 
1994 0.29 90% 10% 43.51 23.97 31.54 23.29 47.25 
2005 0.37 90% 10% 113.86 58.29 72.93 59.37 131.00 
2012 0.28 93% 7% 244.75 151.07 166.86 168.88 312.10 
Urban 
1983 0.30 99% 1% 22.42 18.64 22.19 18.84 20.56 
1994 0.31 99% 1% 70.22 62.29 68.61 58.87 56.15 
2005 0.44 99% 1% 196.64 150.93 162.31 161.18 164.51 


































1983 0.184 94% 6% 497 480   337 438   
1993-94 0.171 92% 8% 503 492   362 444 640 
2004-05 0.206 91% 9% 583 604   416 520 818 
2011-12 0.228 93% 7% 715 754 1011 554 603 929 
Urban 




wage/salary Casual  Others   
1993-94 0.239 92% 8% 862 1071 558 1079   
2004-05 0.283 92% 8% 982 1213 580 1445   
2011-12 0.304 91% 9% 1259 1671 796 1870   
Note: In 2004-05 prices. Other tables in this section give expenditure in current prices. 
 









Mean household expenditure per capita 
 




OBC   
Other 
religion 
Rural 2005 0.21 92% 8% 408 469 548 709 567 532 778 
2012 0.23 94% 6% 951 1107 1276 1584 1246 1163 1885 
Urban 2005 0.28 87% 13% 786 747 901 1404 687 832 1409 




(iii) Education: Theil decomposition and mean expenditure per capita 
 Year 
Theil 






















1994 0.171 93% 7% 245 279 305 328 391 487 
2005 0.206 89% 11% 467 576 721 740 988 1291 
2012 0.228 92% 8% 1070 1171 1238 1412 1619 2104 
Urban 
1994 0.239 86% 14% 303 350 396 419 552 788 
2005 0.283 73% 27% 615 834 1133 1249 1774 2221 
2012 0.304 75% 25% 1427 1612 1773 1911 2465 4205 
 
 









Mean household expenditure per capita 
 
Northwest Centre Northeast South & West Kerala 
Rural 
1983 0.184 96% 4% 137 99 109 115 140 
1994 0.171 95% 5% 365 249 279 285 390 
2005 0.206 91% 9% 687 468 564 573 1013 
2012 0.228 87% 13% 1591 1003 1132 1469 2510 
Urban 
1983 0.215 98% 2% 190 139 167 167 179 
1994 0.239 97% 3% 555 390 485 461 494 
2005 0.283 97% 3% 1154 857 1111 1091 1291 
2012 0.304 96% 4% 2688 1831 2357 2587 3066 
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